Commonwealth v. Urban
2006 Mass. App. LEXIS 948, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 301, 853 N.E.2d 594 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A jury instruction regarding incapacity to consent due to intoxication constitutes reversible error if it fails to clarify that the jury must find a degree of intoxication so severe that it renders the complainant "wholly insensible" and thus incapable of consenting.
Facts:
- The defendant and the complainant engaged in sexual intercourse.
- The complainant had consumed drugs and/or alcohol on the evening of the encounter.
- The central dispute at trial was whether the complainant was capable of consenting, with the Commonwealth arguing she was too intoxicated to do so.
- The defendant contended that while the complainant was intoxicated, she remained sober enough to validly consent and had done so.
- The complainant made no outward signs that the sexual acts were non-consensual.
- Evidence was presented suggesting the complainant maintained mental acuity despite her intoxication, such as her yelling from a car window to another driver about not having a license.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was first tried for rape in Superior Court, which ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a verdict.
- Upon retrial in the Superior Court, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of rape.
- The defendant appealed the conviction to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, arguing the trial judge made several errors.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction on incapacity to consent due to intoxication constitute reversible error if it fails to specify that the jury must determine the level of intoxication and find that it was so severe as to render the complainant 'wholly insensible' and thus incapable of consenting?
Opinions:
Majority - Brown, J.
Yes, the jury instruction was a reversible error because it misstated the law on incapacity to consent due to intoxication. The court reasoned that for more than a century, Massachusetts law, established in Commonwealth v. Burke, has required that for intoxication to negate consent, the individual must be rendered "wholly insensible" or in a "state of utter stupefaction." The trial judge's instruction failed to convey this high standard, instead listing intoxication alongside conditions like sleep and unconsciousness, which could mislead the jury into believing any level of intoxication automatically negates consent. By omitting the "wholly insensible" language or a comparable high standard, the instruction relieved the Commonwealth of its burden to prove the complainant was incapacitated to that requisite degree. The error was prejudicial because the complainant's capacity was the central issue, and it was compounded because the defense counsel formulated his closing argument in reliance on the judge's assurance that she would give a proper instruction, making his concessions about the complainant's intoxication highly damaging under the flawed charge that was ultimately given.
Analysis:
This decision forcefully reaffirms the long-standing, high standard required to prove incapacity to consent due to intoxication, solidifying the 'wholly insensible' test from Commonwealth v. Burke. It serves as a crucial precedent for trial judges, emphasizing the necessity of precise and complete jury instructions on the essential elements of a crime, especially when that element is the central point of dispute. The ruling also underscores the potential for reversible error when a judge's failure to deliver a promised instruction undermines a defendant's trial strategy, creating an independent basis for prejudice. This case will likely be cited to ensure that juries are not misled into equating mere intoxication with legal incapacity, thereby improperly lowering the prosecution's burden of proof.
