Commonwealth v. Troila
571 NE 2d 391, 410 Mass. 203 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not bar a retrial when a prior trial has ended in a mistrial, provided the mistrial was declared out of 'manifest necessity,' such as a hung jury or incurable prejudice from juror misconduct.
Facts:
- On the evening of May 1, 1987, Matthew Troila was seen with the victim.
- A witness, Margaret Wilson, stated she drove Troila, his brother Joseph, and the victim to a lot in Roxbury.
- Wilson testified that Troila and his brother left the car with the victim to look for drugs.
- When Troila returned to the car without the victim, he told Wilson that he had killed the victim because the victim had 'made a pass' at him.
- The victim's body was discovered in the lot on May 2, 1987, with multiple fatal stab wounds to the heart and neck.
- Debra Miele, with whom Troila was living, testified that Troila told her on May 2, 'I think I killed somebody last night,' because the victim was a homosexual and 'had tried something on him sexually.'
- Troila's sister also testified that about a week after the murder, Troila told her he thought he had killed somebody.
Procedural Posture:
- Matthew Troila was indicted for murder in the first degree.
- Troila's first trial in the state trial court ended in a mistrial after the jury declared it was unable to reach a verdict.
- A second trial was held, which also ended in a mistrial after the judge found that a juror's unauthorized view of the crime scene had tainted the jury.
- Troila was tried for a third time, and the jury convicted him of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.
- Troila, as the defendant-appellant, appealed his conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar a defendant's retrial for murder when two prior trials for the same offense ended in mistrials, one due to a hung jury and the second due to juror misconduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Nolan, J.
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial where previous trials were terminated due to 'manifest necessity.' The court's reasoning addressed three main points raised by the defendant. First, on the double jeopardy claim, the court affirmed that retrials are permissible following mistrials declared for manifest necessity. A hung jury, which ended the first trial, is a classic example of manifest necessity under United States v. Perez. The second mistrial, declared after a juror's unauthorized view of the crime scene tainted the proceedings, was also a manifest necessity because the trial judge properly heard from counsel, explored alternatives, and reasonably concluded the jury could no longer be impartial. Second, the court held that the trial judge correctly excluded a tape-recorded statement from the defendant's brother, Joseph, as inadmissible hearsay because it did not qualify as a statement against penal interest and its only purpose—to impeach another witness—depended on its truth. Finally, the court found no error in the jury instructions, holding that a manslaughter instruction was not warranted because the victim's alleged non-violent homosexual advance does not constitute 'reasonable provocation' for a heat of passion killing, and a 'mere presence' instruction was unnecessary as the prosecution's theory was that the defendant was the sole perpetrator, not a joint venturer.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the well-established 'manifest necessity' exception to the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, confirming its application to both hung juries and juror misconduct. The decision underscores the significant discretion granted to trial judges in declaring mistrials and the deference they receive on appeal if proper procedures are followed. Additionally, the court's rejection of a non-violent homosexual advance as 'reasonable provocation' for manslaughter reflects the legal standards of its time and provides a significant precedent in cases involving 'gay panic' defenses, highlighting that such claims are legally insufficient to mitigate a charge of murder.
