Commonwealth v. Stowell
1983 Mass. LEXIS 1457, 389 Mass. 171, 449 N.E.2d 357 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A state law criminalizing adultery does not violate the constitutional right to privacy because the state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting conduct that threatens the institution of marriage, and the right to engage in such conduct is not a fundamental right.
Facts:
- On October 13, 1980, police officers observed Judith Stowell motion to the driver of a van, have a short conversation, and enter the vehicle.
- The officers followed the van as it drove to a secluded, wooded area where it parked off a dirt road.
- The officers located the parked van and, looking through the rear window, observed Stowell and the male driver engaged in sexual intercourse.
- Both Stowell and the driver were adults.
- When confronted by the officers, both individuals stated that they were married, but not to each other.
Procedural Posture:
- Judith Stowell was charged with adultery in violation of Massachusetts law.
- Following a bench trial in the District Court, Stowell was convicted and fined $50.
- Stowell appealed her conviction to the jury of six session in the District Court.
- Prior to the jury trial, Stowell filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing the adultery statute was unconstitutional.
- The District Court judge, without ruling on the motion, reported the case and its constitutional questions to the Appeals Court.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted Stowell's application for direct appellate review.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that criminalizes adultery violate the fundamental right of personal privacy guaranteed by the United States Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Lynch, J.
No, a state statute that criminalizes adultery does not violate the fundamental right of personal privacy under the United States Constitution. While the Constitution protects a right of personal privacy related to fundamental decisions concerning marriage, procreation, and family, this protection does not extend to all private consensual sexual conduct. The court reasoned that the right to commit adultery is not a 'fundamental' personal right 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' Therefore, the state's legitimate interest in regulating and protecting the institution of marriage is sufficient to justify the statute. The court also noted that while the statute has fallen into 'desuetude' and is rarely enforced, this does not render it constitutionally invalid; its repeal is a matter for the legislature, not the judiciary.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that the constitutional right to privacy is not absolute and does not protect all private, consensual sexual conduct between adults. It affirms the state's significant police power to regulate matters related to the institution of marriage, establishing that protecting marriage is a legitimate state interest sufficient to justify criminalizing adultery. The court's holding also clarifies that a law's lack of enforcement does not, by itself, render it unconstitutional, thereby preserving the separation of powers by leaving the repeal of such 'outdated' statutes to the legislative branch.
