Commonwealth v. Stoute
422 Mass. 782 (1996)
Rule of Law:
Under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, a person is considered 'seized' when a police officer initiates a pursuit with the obvious intent to stop and detain the person for questioning, regardless of whether the person has been physically apprehended or has submitted to the officer's authority.
Facts:
- On July 22, 1991, at approximately 10:45 p.m., three plainclothes police officers in an unmarked car were driving in a high-crime area of Roxbury, Boston.
- The officers observed two young men on bicycles, one of whom was Dion L. Stoute and the other wore a hooded sweatshirt.
- A young woman in a group on the sidewalk yelled to the officers that the man in the hooded sweatshirt had a gun.
- The officers turned their vehicle around, pulled alongside the bicyclists, and stated, 'Police, hold up a minute.'
- The bicyclist in the hooded sweatshirt stopped and was frisked by an officer, but no weapon was found.
- Dion Stoute, the other bicyclist, continued to ride down the street at an increased speed.
- The officers followed Stoute in their car, again pulled alongside him, and an officer again asked him to stop.
- Stoute then rode onto the sidewalk, jumped off his bicycle, ran, and threw a white plastic bag over a fence while vaulting it.
Procedural Posture:
- Dion L. Stoute was charged in Superior Court with trafficking in cocaine and possession of marihuana.
- Prior to trial, Stoute filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence, arguing it was obtained through an illegal seizure.
- The Superior Court judge held an evidentiary hearing and subsequently denied the motion to suppress.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Stoute on both charges.
- Stoute appealed the denial of his suppression motion to the intermediate appellate court.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the appeal to itself on its own motion before the intermediate court could hear it.
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Issue:
Does a police pursuit intended to stop and detain a person for inquiry constitute a 'seizure' under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights at the moment the pursuit begins, rather than upon physical detention?
Opinions:
Majority - Greaney, J.
Yes, a police pursuit intended to stop a person constitutes a 'seizure' under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights from its inception. The court rejects the narrower federal standard from California v. Hodari D., which defines a seizure as requiring either the application of physical force or submission to a show of authority. The court reasons that Article 14 provides more substantive protection to individuals than the Fourth Amendment. Adhering to its precedent in Commonwealth v. Thibeau, the court holds that a pursuit which, viewed objectively, indicates to a person that they are not free to leave is the functional equivalent of a seizure. This standard prevents police from turning a mere 'hunch' into reasonable suspicion by inducing flight or the abandonment of evidence. Although the pursuit of Stoute was a seizure, it was justified by reasonable suspicion. The police had an informant's tip about a firearm in a high-crime area, and once Stoute's companion was found to be unarmed, it was reasonable to suspect the gun had been passed to Stoute, especially given his subsequent flight.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant departure from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by providing broader protections under the Massachusetts state constitution. By rejecting the Hodari D. physical-seizure rule, the court ensures that the legality of a police pursuit is judged from its outset, requiring officers to have reasonable suspicion at an earlier point. This holding makes it more difficult for prosecutors in Massachusetts to use evidence abandoned during a police chase if the initial pursuit was not justified. The case solidifies a line of state court decisions that interpret their own constitutions as more protective of individual liberty than the U.S. Constitution, creating a crucial distinction for legal practice within the Commonwealth.
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