Commonwealth v. Smith
615 A.2d 321, 532 Pa. 177, 1992 Pa. LEXIS 449 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial when prosecutorial misconduct is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of denying a fair trial, even if the misconduct was not intended to provoke a mistrial.
Facts:
- In June 1979, schoolteacher Susan Reinert and her two young children were murdered.
- William Bradfield, Reinert's fiancé and fellow teacher, and Jay C. Smith, their school principal, were allegedly involved in a conspiracy to murder Reinert for insurance money.
- During Jay C. Smith's original trial, the prosecution's theory was that the murder occurred in Pennsylvania, while the defense theorized it occurred in Cape May, New Jersey, where Smith had not been.
- Physical evidence, specifically grains of sand, was discovered between the victim's toes during her autopsy, which could have supported the defense's theory about the murder location.
- The Commonwealth's chief witness, Mr. Martray, testified against Smith, denying any agreement for his testimony, despite actually awaiting sentencing for unrelated crimes and later receiving favorable treatment.
- The prosecution deliberately concealed the adhesive 'lifters' containing the sand from the defense, despite an internal memo from the prosecutor stating its extreme materiality to the defense case.
- During Smith's trial, after investigator Corporal John Balshy testified about finding the sand lifters, the Pennsylvania state police discovered the missing lifters in their evidence locker, but the Commonwealth suppressed this discovery.
- For over two years, while Smith's case was on direct appeal, the Commonwealth continued to suppress the exculpatory evidence and even investigated Corporal Balshy for perjury related to his testimony about the sand.
Procedural Posture:
- Jay C. Smith was convicted of murder in his first trial.
- Smith appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted Smith a new trial due to the admission of impermissible hearsay testimony (Commonwealth v. Smith, 523 Pa. 577, 568 A.2d 600 (1989)).
- Before Smith could be retried, he filed a motion in the trial court to preclude a new trial based on double jeopardy, citing after-discovered evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.
- The trial court held hearings and found that intentional prosecutorial misconduct had occurred.
- The Superior Court, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the trial court's finding of misconduct but deferred the question of the appropriate remedy to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur (agreed to hear the appeal) to consider the double jeopardy question.
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Issue:
Does the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution bar retrial when prosecutorial misconduct is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant and deny a fair trial, even if the misconduct was not intended to provoke a mistrial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Flaherty
Yes, the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution bars retrial when prosecutorial misconduct is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of denying a fair trial. The Court found that the prosecutor's conduct in this case was not only impermissible but had constitutional implications under the double jeopardy clause, prohibiting retrial. The misconduct included knowingly withholding physical evidence (sand lifters from the victim's toes, which supported the defense's Cape May murder theory) and deliberately denying the existence of a plea agreement with the chief witness, Mr. Martray, who received favorable sentencing treatment for his testimony. The Court highlighted that the prosecution suppressed evidence during trial, continued to suppress it during direct appeal, and even implied that a police witness who reported the evidence was fabricating. While federal standards, as interpreted in Oregon v. Kennedy and followed in Commonwealth v. Simons, primarily focused on misconduct intended to provoke a mistrial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that such egregious bad faith, intended to prejudice the defendant and deny him a fair trial, violates all principles of justice and fairness embodied in the Pennsylvania Constitution's double jeopardy clause, thus requiring a broader application of its protections.
Analysis:
This case significantly broadens the protection against double jeopardy under the Pennsylvania Constitution compared to the federal standard set by Oregon v. Kennedy. By establishing that intentional prosecutorial misconduct designed to prejudice a defendant and deny a fair trial can bar retrial, regardless of intent to provoke a mistrial, the ruling provides a stronger safeguard against egregious government overreach. This decision serves as a powerful deterrent against improper prosecutorial tactics, particularly the suppression of exculpatory evidence and witness agreements, and emphasizes the state judiciary's role in upholding fundamental fairness. Future cases in Pennsylvania involving claims of intentional prosecutorial misconduct will likely rely on this expanded interpretation, making it more difficult for the Commonwealth to retry defendants where such misconduct is proven.
