Commonwealth v. Sheppard
1994 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2904, 436 Pa. Super. 584, 648 A.2d 563 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Psychological testimony regarding a defendant's paranoid personality disorder is not admissible to support an 'imperfect self-defense' claim unless there is an objective factual basis to trigger the defendant's subjective, albeit unreasonable, belief that he was in danger of serious bodily injury.
Facts:
- On March 9, 1991, John Jay Sheppard, his brother Robert, Angel Stier, and James Prenter were drinking in the basement of Sheppard's home.
- The victim, Karl Kerr, arrived and joined the group in drinking beer and whiskey; both Sheppard and Kerr became intoxicated.
- An argument ensued after Kerr began 'slap boxing' with Robert, hitting him in the face. Sheppard became angry, but Kerr apologized.
- A second argument occurred after Kerr broke a mug belonging to Sheppard, who accused Kerr of always breaking his things.
- Following the arguments, Sheppard went into an adjacent utility room and returned with a long-handled ax.
- Sheppard swung the ax at Kerr, who was sitting at the bar. Kerr then moved to a chair, and Sheppard followed him.
- Sheppard struck the unarmed Kerr with the ax, hitting his side. After Kerr was down on the floor, Sheppard continued to strike him repeatedly.
- An autopsy revealed Kerr died from 17 incised wounds to the head.
Procedural Posture:
- John Jay Sheppard was tried for murder in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, which is a trial court.
- A jury found Sheppard guilty of first-degree murder.
- The trial court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
- Sheppard, represented by new counsel from the same public defender's office, filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court.
- On appeal, Sheppard claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is trial counsel ineffective for failing to argue that psychological testimony of a defendant's paranoid personality disorder is relevant to establish an 'imperfect self-defense' claim to reduce a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter, when there is no objective evidence that the defendant was in danger?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Tamilia
No, trial counsel was not ineffective because the underlying claim is without merit. An imperfect self-defense claim requires a defendant's subjective belief of being in imminent danger, but that subjective belief must be triggered by some objective factual circumstances. Here, the facts, which showed Kerr was sitting unarmed when Sheppard retrieved an ax from another room and initiated the attack, provided no objective basis for Sheppard to believe he was in danger. A mere diagnosis of a paranoid personality disorder, without more, cannot create a subjective belief of danger where no objective threat exists. To allow such evidence would 'open the flood gates' to defenses based entirely on a subjective mental state, contrary to the purpose of the statute, which addresses misperceptions of factual circumstances. Therefore, the psychological testimony was not relevant to an imperfect self-defense claim, and counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless argument.
Concurring and dissenting - Judge Cercone
Yes, trial counsel's failure to argue for the admission of the psychological testimony for an imperfect self-defense claim has arguable merit. Precedent establishes that psychiatric testimony is admissible to prove the subjective element of self-defense—that the defendant had an honest, bona fide belief he was in danger. Dr. Levit's proposed testimony, stating that Sheppard's paranoid disorder caused him to 'misperceive what's going on in their environment,' directly addresses his subjective state of mind. This testimony could have lent credibility to Sheppard's claim that he honestly, though unreasonably, feared for his life, and the jury should have been permitted to hear it. By disbelieving Sheppard's version of events and excluding the evidence, the majority is improperly engaging in fact-finding.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of the 'imperfect self-defense' doctrine in Pennsylvania by establishing an objective predicate for the admission of subjective evidence. The court mandates that before a defendant's subjective mental state (such as paranoia) can be considered, there must be some objective evidence of a threat in the surrounding circumstances. This ruling prevents defendants from using a pre-existing mental health diagnosis as a standalone basis to mitigate murder to manslaughter. It effectively channels defenses based primarily on mental disorders toward the 'guilty but mentally ill' or insanity statutes, preserving imperfect self-defense for cases involving a misperception of actual, external events.
