Commonwealth v. Shea
1995 Mass. App. LEXIS 6, 644 N.E.2d 244, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 7 (1995)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The natural state of the ocean is not an 'instrument or instrumentality' subject to human control and therefore does not qualify as a 'dangerous weapon' under G. L. c. 265, § 15A for purposes of assault and battery.
Facts:
- On June 15, 1991, the defendant and his friend invited two women to board the defendant’s boat for a ride.
- The defendant drove the boat about five miles offshore from Boston, stopped, disrobed, and made sexual remarks and advances toward the women.
- The women demanded that the defendant return them to Boston, but he refused and continued his offensive behavior, becoming angry at their reaction.
- The defendant threw the women overboard into the ocean and drove away without looking back.
- When the first woman screamed that she did not know how to swim, the defendant jumped overboard, held her head under the water, and then reboarded the boat.
- Before throwing the second woman into the water, she also told him that she could not swim.
- The women were rescued after managing to swim within shouting distance of a sailboat.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury found the defendant guilty of kidnapping (two counts), attempted murder (two counts), assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (the ocean) (two counts), and indecent assault and battery (two counts).
- The defendant assented to the indecent assault and battery convictions being placed on file.
- The defendant appealed the remaining convictions, arguing the trial judge erroneously denied (1) his request for a continuance of the trial; (2) his motion in limine seeking to preclude the Commonwealth’s use of videotapes; and (3) his motion for required findings of not guilty on all indictments.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Does the natural state of the ocean constitute a 'dangerous weapon' under G. L. c. 265, § 15A for purposes of assault and battery? 2. Was there sufficient evidence to support convictions for attempted murder and kidnapping? 3. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a trial continuance or in allowing the Commonwealth to use videotapes as chalks?
Opinions:
Majority - Perretta, J.
No, the natural state of the ocean does not constitute a 'dangerous weapon' under G. L. c. 265, § 15A. Yes, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for attempted murder and kidnapping. No, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a trial continuance or in allowing the use of videotapes as chalks. The court reasoned that a 'dangerous weapon' under G. L. c. 265, § 15A, refers to an 'instrument or instrumentality' that a batterer controls through possession or authority for the intentional application of force. Because the ocean in its natural state cannot be possessed or controlled by a person, it cannot be considered an object or instrumentality capable of use as a weapon. This conclusion, however, does not preclude criminal liability for causing harm by subjecting someone to a force of nature, but merely limits the application of § 15A. For the attempted murder convictions, the court found sufficient evidence to infer specific intent to kill. The defendant threw the women five miles offshore into 52-degree, choppy water, knowing they could not swim and after having physically held one woman's head underwater. This conduct, creating extreme peril, supported the inference of murderous intent. The court also affirmed the use of videotapes as illustrative 'chalks,' finding no abuse of discretion given proper limiting instructions and their relevance to demonstrating the defendant's awareness of the conditions and thus his intent. Regarding the kidnapping convictions, the court determined there was ample evidence beyond the attempted murder actions. The defendant refused the women's demands to return to shore after his sexual advances, forcing them to remain at sea against their will while he committed indecent assault and battery, thus satisfying the elements of kidnapping. Finally, the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion. The defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice, as his psychiatrist was still able to testify that the defendant’s condition was consistent with a temporal lobe disorder, and it was not shown that further psychoneurological testing would have provided more conclusive evidence regarding a seizure at the specific time of the incident.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the legal definition of a 'dangerous weapon' in Massachusetts, establishing a requirement that the object or instrumentality must be subject to human possession or control. This narrows the scope of G. L. c. 265, § 15A, for crimes involving natural elements. Furthermore, the decision reinforces that specific intent for serious crimes like attempted murder can be inferred from the defendant's actions and the created circumstances, especially when those actions demonstrate a disregard for human life. It also provides guidance on the permissible use of demonstrative evidence, like videotapes as 'chalks,' ensuring they aid jury understanding without becoming prejudicial evidence themselves.
