Commonwealth v. Shea
460 Mass. 163, 2011 Mass. LEXIS 591, 950 N.E. 2d 393 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's silence in response to an accusation may be admitted as an adoptive admission if it is apparent the defendant heard and understood the statement, had an opportunity to respond, and would reasonably have been expected to respond. A jury verdict for first-degree murder is not defective for failing to specify the theory of guilt on a verdict slip when only one theory was presented and instructed.
Facts:
- On May 10, 2007, around 9:30 p.m., Donnell Godbolt, a member of the “SWAT Team” gang, borrowed his girlfriend’s white Toyota Camry automobile.
- Godbolt and the defendant drove to Robert Morales’s home, another SWAT Team member, where Morales gave Godbolt a .40 caliber Glock semiautomatic pistol.
- Later that night, Godbolt picked up Robert Lee Arnold, Jr., then Alexander Vaughn, and the defendant, all associated with the SWAT Team or Eastern Avenue gang, to drive Arnold to Western New England College.
- En route, Godbolt diverted down Wilbraham Road, known as a “hang-out spot” for the rival Bristol Street gang, with the vehicle’s headlights off.
- As the vehicle slowed, the defendant opened the rear passenger window, leaned out, and fired six shots at a group of people on the front porch and steps of 338 Wilbraham Road.
- One shot struck fourteen-year-old Dymond McGowan in the abdomen, causing her death; Robert Lee Arnold, Jr., observed the defendant pull his upper body back into the car holding a black object that looked like a gun and heard him yell, “SWAT Team.”
- After the shooting, the defendant told Morales that he “just did the hit on Bristol,” wiping the gun with his T-shirt before returning it to Morales.
- In the early hours of the next day, the defendant confessed to Paul Fowler, a SWAT Team founder, that he “just went riding to the . . . other side” and later, driving past the crime scene, stated, “This is the spot I just hit up,” adding he “stuck his hand out the window, and started firing,” and “I don’t know if I hit anyone. It was probably one of those Bristol Street boys.”
- On May 12, after media reports of a girl’s death, the defendant told Morales that he “didn’t mean for this shit to happen,” explaining, “when I was shooting, the dude pulled the girl in front of him,” and also told Fowler he felt bad about the girl being killed.
- A few days after the shooting, seventeen-year-old Leah Johnson accused the defendant on the street, saying, “That’s messed up that you did that to Dymond. Why would you do it? She was only fourteen,” to which the defendant gave a “blank look” and did not respond.
Procedural Posture:
- The Commonwealth brought charges against the defendant in Superior Court.
- A jury in the Superior Court convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm.
- The defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
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Issue:
1. Does a trial judge's instruction to prospective jurors to make “mental notes” of affirmative answers, followed by individual sidebar questioning, jeopardize the defendant's right to an impartial jury? 2. Did the trial judge err by allowing a witness to testify to the defendant’s silence after she accused him of the killing, as an adoptive admission? 3. Did the trial judge err by preventing the defendant from admitting impeachment evidence that a key percipient witness had told another witness he had not seen anything during the shooting? 4. Did the trial judge's instruction on transferred intent, which included a statement equating an intent to shoot with an intent to kill, create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice for first-degree premeditated murder? 5. Did the trial judge err in refusing to ask the jury for clarification of their first-degree murder finding when they checked the guilty box but did not separately indicate reliance on the deliberate premeditation theory, the only theory on which they were instructed?
Opinions:
Majority - Gants, J.
1. No, the judge's jury selection protocol did not jeopardize the defendant's right to an impartial jury. The court held that because all prospective jurors were individually brought to sidebar and questioned about any affirmative answers, the judge's unorthodox practice did not constitute an abuse of discretion or deny the defendant his right. However, the court discouraged the use of this protocol in the future, recommending jurors be asked to raise hands in open court for non-embarrassing questions to ensure a clearer record. 2. No, the judge did not err in allowing the testimony regarding the defendant’s silence as an adoptive admission. The court found that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude the defendant heard and understood Leah Johnson's accusation, had an opportunity to respond, and that a reasonable person in those circumstances (accused of a recent killing) would have denied it if innocent. This aligns with precedent such as Commonwealth v. Braley and Commonwealth v. Olszewski. 3. Yes, the judge erred by excluding impeachment evidence that Robert Lee Arnold, Jr., had told Paul Fowler he “did not see anything” during the shooting. This statement was inconsistent with Arnold's trial testimony, where he described seeing the defendant lean out the car window and pull back a gun-like object, and was relevant to Arnold's credibility as the only percipient witness in the car. However, the court concluded that this error was not prejudicial because Arnold himself testified to having a limited view due to duffel bags and putting his head down, so the excluded statement would have added little to the jury's overall assessment of his credibility. 4. No, the judge’s instruction on transferred intent did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. While acknowledging that one sentence, “if I intend to shoot one person . . . and accidentally, I hit or injure another, I’m liable for murder, if . . . death results in the case,” did not precisely describe premeditated first-degree murder, the court determined that viewing the instruction as a whole, especially with explicit instructions requiring a “specific intent to cause death” and a “decision to kill” for deliberate premeditation, ensured the isolated error played no role in the jury’s verdict. 5. No, the judge did not err in refusing to ask the jury for clarification of their finding. The court reasoned that when a jury is instructed on only one theory of first-degree murder (deliberate premeditation, in this case), and returns a general verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, the verdict is not defective even if the specific theory box is not checked on the verdict slip. There is no ambiguity as to the theory of guilt or risk of non-unanimity when only one theory is presented for consideration.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the acceptable bounds of jury selection protocols while emphasizing best practices for transparency. It reinforces the application of the adoptive admission doctrine, allowing a defendant's silence to be used as evidence when the circumstances warrant a denial. Crucially, the court demonstrates its approach to reviewing potentially flawed jury instructions, asserting that isolated errors may not necessitate reversal if the instructions, when viewed holistically, accurately convey the necessary legal principles. Furthermore, the court strongly advocates for juror note-taking, signaling a potential shift towards greater juror engagement and a reevaluation of existing rules in Massachusetts, aligning with modern judicial practices in other jurisdictions.
