Commonwealth v. Schnopps
417 N.E.2d 1213, 1981 Mass. LEXIS 1150, 383 Mass. 178 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter if there is any evidence of provocation legally adequate to cause a reasonable person to lose self-control in a heat of passion, and a spouse's sudden, verbal admission of adultery may constitute such provocation.
Facts:
- George A. Schnopps and his wife of fourteen years, Marilyn R. Schnopps, were experiencing marital problems for about six months prior to her death.
- George accused Marilyn of seeing another man, but she consistently denied the accusations.
- Three weeks before the killing, Marilyn left George, taking their children to her mother's house, and refused to speak with him.
- On October 13, 1979, George asked Marilyn to their home to discuss their marriage, during which he cried and begged her to keep the family together.
- Marilyn refused, stated she would take everything in court, and then, pointing to her crotch, said, 'You will never touch this again, because I have got something bigger and better for it.'
- George testified that upon hearing these words, his mind 'went blank' and he 'went berserk.'
- He then retrieved a pistol he had purchased the day before, shot his wife, and then shot himself.
Procedural Posture:
- George A. Schnopps was prosecuted for the murder of his wife, Marilyn R. Schnopps.
- At trial in the Superior Court, Schnopps's request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter was denied by the judge.
- The jury convicted Schnopps of murder in the first degree.
- Schnopps was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.
- Schnopps (appellant) appealed the murder conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing the manslaughter instruction.
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Issue:
Does a trial judge commit reversible error by refusing to instruct a jury on voluntary manslaughter when a defendant presents testimony that he killed his estranged wife in a sudden heat of passion immediately following her first-time, taunting verbal admission of adultery?
Opinions:
Majority - Abrams, J.
Yes. A judge's refusal to instruct on voluntary manslaughter is reversible error where the defendant's testimony, if believed, provides evidence of legally adequate provocation. A sudden, verbal admission of adultery can be equivalent to the discovery of the physical act itself and is sufficient evidence of provocation to require a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The credibility of the defendant's testimony regarding his state of mind and the suddenness of the provocation is a question of fact for the jury, not the judge, to decide. Withholding the instruction usurped the jury's function to resolve factual disputes and assess witness credibility, denying them the opportunity to consider a verdict that was open to them on the evidence.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal principle that 'mere words' can, in certain circumstances like a sudden admission of adultery, constitute legally adequate provocation to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter. It lowers the evidentiary threshold for requiring a manslaughter instruction, emphasizing that any evidence supporting the defendant's theory, regardless of how incredible the judge may find it, must be presented to the jury. The case strongly affirms the jury's role as the sole arbiter of witness credibility and factual disputes, limiting a trial judge's power to withhold lesser-included offense instructions based on an evaluation of the evidence's weight.
