Commonwealth v. Rosario

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
422 Mass. 48 (1996)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An otherwise admissible statement made by an arrestee is not to be excluded on the ground of unreasonable delay in arraignment if the statement is made within six hours of the arrest. Statements made after the six-hour period are inadmissible unless the defendant has made an informed and voluntary written or recorded waiver of the right to prompt arraignment.

Facts:

In August 1993, Springfield police were investigating a series of burglaries.
Police obtained a description of a suspect, and on August 25, 1993, they located a man matching the description, Hipólito Rosario, who fled from them.
After a long pursuit, police apprehended Rosario between 2:30 p.m. and 3 p.m.
Rosario provided a false name, Hector Gonzalez, for whom outstanding assault warrants existed. Police arrested Rosario on these warrants.
Rosario was held at the police station overnight without being arraigned.
The next morning, commencing at 9:15 a.m., police administered Miranda warnings, which Rosario waived, and proceeded to interrogate him about the burglaries.
Rosario initially denied involvement but later confessed, agreed to identify the houses he had burglarized, and signed a typed statement at 11:55 a.m.
Following the confession, police brought Rosario to court for arraignment that afternoon on the outstanding warrants.

Procedural Posture:

Hipólito Rosario was charged with multiple counts of breaking and entering and larceny in Superior Court.
Rosario filed a motion to suppress his oral and written confessions.
The Superior Court judge (trial court) granted the motion, suppressing the statements.
A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the Commonwealth's application for an interlocutory appeal.
The Appeals Court (intermediate appellate court) affirmed the trial court's suppression order.
The Commonwealth's application for further appellate review was granted by the Supreme Judicial Court (highest court).

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Issue:

Does a deliberate delay in a defendant's arraignment for the purpose of interrogation, in violation of Mass. R. Crim. P. 7(a)(1), require the suppression of an otherwise voluntary confession obtained during that delay?

Opinions:

Majority - Wilkins, J.

No, a deliberate delay in arraignment for the purpose of interrogation does not automatically require suppression of a confession. To provide clarity, the court prospectively establishes a "safe harbor" rule: an otherwise admissible statement will not be suppressed due to unreasonable delay if it is made within six hours of arrest. The previous, vague "reasonableness" standard led to inconsistent application. This new bright-line rule eliminates debate over what constitutes a reasonable delay and applies regardless of when court is in session. Although the interrogation here occurred outside the newly established six-hour period, the police conduct was not sufficiently flagrant to warrant suppression because the prior law was unclear, as evidenced by the court's recent ruling in Commonwealth v. Fryar. Therefore, applying an exclusionary rule in this case would not serve a deterrent purpose.

Dissenting - Liacos, C.J.

Yes, the confession should be suppressed because it was obtained through an intentional violation of the prompt presentment rule. While the creation of a six-hour safe harbor rule is a positive development, the majority errs in two ways. First, allowing a defendant to waive the prompt arraignment right after the six-hour period has expired will eviscerate the rule, as police will simply hold a suspect beyond six hours and then obtain waivers for both Miranda and prompt presentment. Second, the new rule should be applied to this case; since Rosario's statements were obtained well after the six-hour period, they should be suppressed to remedy the clear violation of his rights.

Concurring - O'Connor, J.

No, the confession should not be suppressed in this specific case. While I agree with the court's ultimate order to deny the defendant's motion, I agree with the Chief Justice's dissenting view on the issue of waiver. A statement made after the six-hour safe harbor period has expired should be inadmissible, regardless of any purported waiver of prompt presentment.

Analysis:

This decision replaces the vague "reasonableness" standard for pre-arraignment delay with a bright-line, six-hour "safe harbor" rule in Massachusetts. It provides law enforcement with a clear window to conduct interrogations post-arrest without fear of suppression based on delay, thereby increasing procedural certainty. However, the decision also establishes a firm outer limit on such questioning, aiming to prevent indefinite detentions for interrogation purposes. The disagreement between the majority and dissent regarding waivers after the six-hour period creates a point of contention that future litigation will likely need to resolve, specifically whether the safe harbor is an absolute cutoff or a waivable right.

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