Commonwealth v. Redmond
264 Va. 321, 2002 Va. LEXIS 105, 568 S.E.2d 695 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A suspect must articulate their desire to have counsel present so clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an unambiguous request for an attorney. An ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney does not require the cessation of questioning.
Facts:
- In May 1999, Virginia Beach police officers arrested Torie Devon Redmond for the murder of Gattis Bowling, Jr.
- Detective Christopher C. Molleen took Redmond to an interview room at the police station for a custodial interrogation.
- Molleen advised Redmond of his Miranda rights, and Redmond stated that he understood them.
- During the interrogation, Redmond asked Detective Molleen, 'Can I speak to my lawyer? I can’t even talk to lawyer before I make any kinds of comments or anything?'
- Detective Molleen continued the interrogation, and Redmond eventually made a confession.
- Approximately two hours later, another officer, Detective Gallagher, began questioning Redmond about an unrelated robbery.
- In response to the robbery questioning, Redmond stated: 'I would like to speak to a lawyer on this one.'
- Detective Gallagher immediately terminated his interrogation of Redmond.
Procedural Posture:
- Torie Devon Redmond was indicted for first-degree murder by a grand jury in the City of Virginia Beach.
- In the circuit court (the trial court), Redmond filed a pretrial motion to suppress his confession, arguing it was obtained after he invoked his right to counsel.
- The circuit court denied the motion to suppress.
- Following a jury trial, Redmond was convicted of first-degree murder, and the circuit court entered a judgment confirming the verdict.
- Redmond (appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.
- A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment.
- Upon rehearing, the Court of Appeals, en banc, affirmed the panel's decision, reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case for a new trial.
- The Commonwealth (appellant) then appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia, with Redmond as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a suspect's statement during a custodial interrogation, 'Can I speak to my lawyer? I can’t even talk to lawyer before I make any kinds of comments or anything?,' constitute a clear and unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel requiring the cessation of questioning?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Hassell
No. The defendant failed to make a clear and unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United States, the court held that interrogation must cease only if a suspect unambiguously requests counsel. A statement is considered ambiguous if a reasonable officer would have understood only that the suspect 'might' be invoking the right to counsel. Applying a de novo review to this mixed question of law and fact, the court examined the videotape of the interrogation. It concluded that Redmond's questions, when considering the context, his tone of voice, inflections, and demeanor, did not constitute a clear assertion of the right to counsel. Instead, the court found the statements could be construed as a desire to obtain more information about his Miranda rights, which did not obligate the officer to stop the interrogation.
Concurring - Justice Kinser
This opinion concurs in the result but does not decide the central issue. Assuming for the sake of argument that Redmond did invoke his right to counsel and that his confession was erroneously admitted, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth presented overwhelming independent evidence of guilt, including a serrated knife with the victim's DNA found between the victim's and defendant's residences, and a T-shirt with the victim's blood found in the defendant's hamper. Furthermore, the confession itself supported a self-defense theory, while other evidence, such as the multiple wounds on a medically frail victim, provided a stronger basis for the jury's finding of premeditation required for first-degree murder. Therefore, any constitutional error did not contribute to the conviction, which should be reinstated.
Dissenting - Justice Koontz
Yes. The defendant's statement 'Can I speak to my lawyer?' was a clear and unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. An objective analysis of the statement would lead a reasonable police officer to understand it as a request for an attorney. The majority's reliance on a subjective interpretation of Redmond's tone and demeanor is improper for this objective inquiry. The dissent also rejects the concurring opinion's harmless error analysis, arguing that the confession was critical for the conviction of first-degree murder. While other evidence implicated Redmond in the killing, the confession provided the primary evidence of the circumstances of the crime, which the jury could have used to find premeditation. Therefore, its erroneous admission cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high threshold established in Davis v. United States for a suspect to successfully invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. By focusing on non-verbal cues like tone and demeanor to classify a seemingly direct question as ambiguous, the court places a significant burden on the suspect to use unequivocally clear and declarative language. This approach can make it more difficult for individuals, particularly those who are less articulate or more deferential, to halt police questioning. The ruling provides law enforcement with more latitude to continue interrogations in the face of statements that are not perfectly phrased demands for a lawyer, potentially leading to more confessions but also raising concerns about protecting suspects' constitutional rights.
