Commonwealth v. Pike
701 N.E.2d 951, 428 Mass. 393, 1998 Mass. LEXIS 691 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A probation condition banning a defendant from an entire state is unconstitutional because it infringes on the fundamental right to interstate travel and is not reasonably related to the goals of probation. Furthermore, a jury instruction on self-defense using deadly force or on the necessity defense is not required unless the evidence demonstrates imminent danger, a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary, the exhaustion of retreat options, and, for necessity, an absence of legal alternatives where the harm avoided clearly outweighs the harm of the crime.
Facts:
- In October 1996, Richard C. Pike and Thomas Cutter, both New Hampshire residents, were hitchhiking on the Massachusetts Turnpike after their pickup truck broke down.
- Frederick Holmes, an off-duty Massachusetts State trooper, stopped his automobile and approached Pike and Cutter on foot because he believed they were a hazard to traffic.
- Holmes, in civilian clothing and without identifying himself as a police officer or displaying a badge, rapidly approached the two men, shouting angrily and using obscenities.
- Pike, feeling scared and believing Holmes was about to attack, grabbed Holmes by the arms when Holmes reached back as if to grab an object or hit him.
- During the ensuing scuffle, Holmes flipped Pike over a guardrail, held him to the ground, tearing Pike's shirt and pulling his hair, before eventually letting go and retreating "a little way away."
- Pike came back over the guardrail, saw Holmes "coming towards" him from five to seven feet away, picked up the truck's radio, and threw it at Holmes, striking him in the side of the head and causing a cut and scrapes.
- Pike and Cutter then entered Holmes's automobile, which was parked in the breakdown lane with keys in the ignition, drove down the turnpike, and later abandoned it in a restaurant parking lot before boarding a bus back to New Hampshire.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard C. Pike was indicted on charges including armed carjacking and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.
- A jury in the trial court (Superior Court) convicted Pike of the lesser offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (instead of armed carjacking) and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.
- Pike was sentenced to a prison term of six to eight years for the assault and battery conviction and a two-year suspended sentence in a house of correction for unauthorized use, with a special probation condition barring him from entering the Commonwealth at any time.
- Pike appealed his convictions and challenged the constitutionality of the special condition of probation.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred Pike's appeal to itself on its own motion.
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Issue:
1. Does the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, require a jury instruction on self-defense by deadly force when the defendant re-engaged in conflict out of anger or revenge and presented no evidence of attempting to retreat or inability to do so? 2. Does the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, require a jury instruction on the defense of necessity for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle when the alleged danger was not imminent, and legal alternatives for escape were available? 3. Is a probation condition that prohibits a defendant from entering the Commonwealth for the duration of his suspended sentence valid, given the fundamental right to interstate travel and the established goals of probation?
Opinions:
Majority - Fried, J.
No, the trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense for the use of deadly force or on the defense of necessity for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, because the evidence did not support the required elements for either defense. For self-defense using deadly force, evidence must show the defendant reasonably and actually believed he was in "imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm" from which he could save himself only by using deadly force, and that he availed himself of all reasonable means of retreating. Pike's testimony indicated he threw the radio out of anger or revenge after the first stage of the altercation, not out of fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm. There was also no evidence that Pike attempted to retreat or was unable to do so after Holmes let go and retreated, thus failing the duty to retreat before resorting to deadly force. For the necessity defense, the defendant must present evidence of (1) clear and imminent danger, (2) reasonable expectation that the action abates the danger, (3) no legal alternative, and (4) that the harm sought to be avoided far exceeds the harm resulting from the crime. Pike failed to show imminent danger when he took the car, as Holmes was neither attacking nor threatening him at that time. He also failed to demonstrate a lack of lawful alternatives, as there was no evidence he could not have walked away from Holmes or remained on the other side of the guardrail. Furthermore, Pike did not show that any harm he might have incurred by staying by the roadside clearly and far exceeded the harm of stealing a car, especially given that Pike and Cutter outnumbered the already injured Holmes. Yes, the probation condition banishing Richard Pike from the Commonwealth is invalid because it infringes on the fundamental constitutional right to interstate travel and is not reasonably related to the legitimate goals of sentencing and probation. While judges have broad latitude in setting probation conditions, and probationers' constitutional rights can be restricted, such conditions must be "reasonably related" to the goals of rehabilitation and public protection. Banishment from an entire state fails to serve a rehabilitative purpose, as there is no showing Pike would reform by staying out of Massachusetts. It also fails to serve a legitimate public safety goal because it violates principles of interstate comity by effectively making other states a "dumping ground for our criminals." This court aligns with the majority of jurisdictions that hold statewide banishment invalid. However, the invalidity of this condition does not invalidate the convictions, only requiring resentencing to remove the offending condition.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the high evidentiary bar for defendants seeking jury instructions on self-defense involving deadly force and the necessity defense, emphasizing the critical requirements of imminent danger, the necessity of the force used, and, for self-defense, the duty to retreat. Crucially, the ruling establishes in Massachusetts that a statewide banishment condition for probation is unconstitutional, reinforcing the fundamental right to interstate travel and upholding principles of interstate comity. This precedent provides essential guidance for trial courts, mandating that probation conditions be narrowly tailored to address specific rehabilitative and public safety goals within the state, rather than simply exporting offenders to other jurisdictions, thereby preventing the arbitrary imposition of such far-reaching restrictions on liberty.
