Commonwealth v. Ogin
373 Pa. Super. 116, 1988 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1056, 540 A.2d 549 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
Parents may not use force on their children that is designed or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress, or gross degradation, even if for discipline, and evidence of such force can support convictions for simple assault and endangering the welfare of children.
Facts:
- During the summer of 1983, Commonwealth witness Ann Marie Blaine observed appellant Debby Ogin drag her 17-month-old daughter April by one arm and fling her against a building, causing April's whole back to hit the building and then stumble against cement steps, after which April screamed for several minutes and had a small red brushburn on her face.
- On December 20, 1983, at a firehouse, Debby Ogin twice slapped April in the face with the back of her hand with "extreme force," causing April to stumble or fall and hit her back against a brick wall, after which a lump was observed on April’s head.
- In February 1984, during dinner, appellant Glynn Wildoner, April's father, pushed a plate of hot spaghetti into April’s face when she did not eat it, causing her to cry, and her face swelled and sustained small burn marks for a few days.
- At the time of these incidents, April was between approximately 17 months and two years old.
Procedural Posture:
- Debby Ogin and Glynn Wildoner were tried by a jury empaneled by the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County.
- The jury convicted Debby Ogin of two counts of simple assault and two counts of endangering the welfare of children, and she was sentenced to two years probation.
- The jury convicted Glynn Wildoner of one count of simple assault and one count of endangering the welfare of children, and he was sentenced to two years special probation consecutive to a sentence he was then serving for unrelated criminal conduct.
- Ogin and Wildoner appealed their convictions to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does evidence showing parents inflicted physical harm and emotional distress on their young child through actions like violently flinging, forcefully striking, and burning, constitute sufficient grounds for convictions of simple assault and endangering the welfare of children, and are such actions justifiable as corporal punishment?
Opinions:
Majority - Beck, Judge
Yes, the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt for simple assault and endangering the welfare of children, and the actions were not justifiable corporal punishment. The court reasoned that 'bodily injury,' which includes 'substantial pain,' can be inferred from the circumstances even without significant permanent injury (citing Commonwealth v. Jorgenson). April's prolonged screaming after being flung against a building, falling against a wall after being struck with "extreme force," and crying after hot food was shoved in her face were sufficient to infer substantial pain, distinguishing these from 'trivial contacts.' Regarding endangering the welfare of children under Section 4304, the court reiterated that this is a broad provision designed to penalize those who knowingly breach a duty to protect children (citing Commonwealth v. Cardwell; Commonwealth v. Taylor). The extreme acts of flinging, striking, and burning a very young child were found to be traumatic and to have created a danger of lasting physical harm, contrary to 'the common sense of the community.' The jury could infer the parents acted 'knowingly' based on the Commonwealth's evidence and the parents' own testimony indicating they understood beating children was wrong. Finally, concerning the justification defense for parents under Section 509 of the Crimes Code, the court acknowledged a parental privilege for corporal punishment but emphasized its limits. Section 509(l)(ii) specifies that force is not justifiable if it is 'designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation.' Given April's very young age (two years old or younger), the court found that the appellants' conduct created at least a 'substantial risk of ... extreme pain or mental distress,' thereby exceeding the bounds of justifiable force. The court cited the Model Penal Code commentary, noting that a 'true parental purpose' (Section 509(l)(i)) does not justify 'extreme force however well-intentioned'.
Concurring - Cavanaugh, Judge
Yes, the evidence in this case supports the convictions, but the criminal justice system should not be a 'facile resort' for enforcing personal notions of parental responsibility. Judge Cavanaugh expressed concern that while the evidence strongly suggests the appellants are not fully suited to parental tasks, other forms of legal intervention, such as child welfare agencies, are generally more appropriate to protect children's interests before resorting to criminal law, which has an 'unavoidably devastating effect.' The concurring opinion highlighted that the appellants were subjects of frequent interventions by social workers and police based on numerous reports of child abuse, but after a year of investigations, the child welfare agency had determined the reports were 'unfounded,' raising 'considerable suspicion regarding the intent' behind the calls and the atmosphere of the prosecution. It concluded that criminal convictions for parents struggling with poverty and mental deficiency would not necessarily improve the child's happiness or normal development.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the limits of parental corporal punishment under Pennsylvania law, emphasizing that the privilege to discipline is not absolute and is circumscribed by the potential for extreme pain or mental distress, especially for very young children. It establishes that even without lasting physical injury, the risk of severe harm or distress can negate a justification defense. The concurring opinion provides a valuable counterpoint, cautioning against the over-criminalization of difficult parenting situations and advocating for initial reliance on social welfare systems over the punitive criminal justice system.
