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Commonwealth v. Norman

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
484 Mass. 330 (2020)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The imposition of global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of pretrial release constitutes a search under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and is unconstitutional unless the government proves that the monitoring serves a specific statutory goal, such as assuring the defendant's appearance in court, that outweighs the severe intrusion on the defendant's privacy.


Facts:

  • In July 2015, Eric Norman was charged with drug offenses and motor vehicle violations.
  • As a condition of his release from custody pending trial, Norman was ordered to wear a GPS monitoring device and stay out of the city of Boston.
  • Norman signed a probation form acknowledging that his location data would be recorded and could be shared with law enforcement.
  • On August 10, 2015, an armed home invasion and robbery occurred in Medford involving two men, but police initially had no suspects.
  • Medford police contacted the probation service to see if any GPS-monitored individuals were near the crime scene.
  • The GPS data placed Norman at the scene of the robbery during the crime and tracked him to a location in Everett immediately after.
  • Based on this location data, police obtained a search warrant for the Everett address and secured a witness identification linking Norman to the robbery.

Procedural Posture:

  • Norman was arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court where the GPS condition was imposed.
  • Following the robbery investigation, Norman was indicted in the Superior Court.
  • Norman filed a motion to suppress the GPS location data in the Superior Court.
  • The Superior Court judge granted the motion to suppress, ruling the search lacked probable cause.
  • The Commonwealth applied to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal.
  • The single justice allowed the appeal to proceed to the Appeals Court.
  • The Supreme Judicial Court granted the Commonwealth's application for direct appellate review.

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Issue:

Does the warrantless imposition of GPS monitoring on a defendant as a condition of pretrial release violate Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights when the monitoring does not serve the specific statutory purposes of ensuring the defendant's return to court or protecting the integrity of the judicial process?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Gaziano

Yes, the imposition of the GPS device was unreasonable and violated Article 14 because it failed to serve a valid statutory interest that could justify the significant privacy intrusion. The Court reasoned that GPS monitoring constitutes a search because it tracks a person's precise movements, and pretrial detainees possess a higher expectation of privacy than convicted probationers. The Court rejected the argument that Norman consented to the search, noting that signing a form to avoid imprisonment is inherently coercive. Under the applicable bail statute (G. L. c. 276, § 58), conditions of release are authorized only to assure the defendant's appearance in court or to protect the integrity of the judicial process (e.g., witness safety). The statute does not authorize conditions for general public safety or deterrence purposes. Because the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that GPS monitoring increased the likelihood of Norman returning to court or protected specific witnesses, the monitoring served no legitimate statutory interest to outweigh the severe intrusion of the device.



Analysis:

This decision significantly strengthens digital privacy rights for pretrial defendants in Massachusetts, distinguishing them from probationers who have diminished privacy expectations. By strictly interpreting the bail statute (G. L. c. 276, § 58), the Court limits the power of judges to impose electronic monitoring solely for general 'dangerousness' or crime deterrence, unless the specific dangerousness detention statute (§ 58A) is invoked. This forces the Commonwealth to provide a specific nexus between the monitoring and the statutory goals of flight risk reduction or witness protection. Practically, this prevents law enforcement from using pretrial release conditions as a dragnet or investigative tool for unrelated crimes.

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