Commonwealth v. Narcisse
457 Mass. 1 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
To escalate a consensual police encounter into a protective pat-frisk, officers must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, in addition to a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous.
Facts:
- On January 30, 2005, Boston police officers Stephen Romano, David Yee, and Stephen McLaughlin were patrolling a Dorchester neighborhood designated a 'hot spot' for gunfire and drug activity.
- The officers were on heightened alert due to a recent shooting nearby and a murder in Randolph the previous night, which raised concerns about potential retaliatory violence.
- At 10 p.m., the officers observed Mark Narcisse and another man, whom they did not recognize, walking down the street.
- The officers pulled their unmarked cruiser alongside the men and initiated a 'field interrogation observation,' a form of consensual questioning.
- Narcisse identified himself, stated he was from Randolph, and said he was coming from a store, an answer one officer found 'implausible.'
- After the men agreed to move to the sidewalk, the officers exited their vehicle and, following a brief conversation, informed Narcisse they were going to pat-frisk him.
- During the pat-frisk, Officer Romano discovered a loaded .22 caliber firearm in the front pocket of Narcisse's jacket.
- A check revealed that Narcisse did not have a license to carry the firearm.
Procedural Posture:
- Mark Narcisse was charged in the trial court with carrying a firearm without a license and possession of ammunition.
- Narcisse filed a motion to suppress the firearm, ammunition, and his statements, arguing the pat-frisk was an unlawful seizure.
- The motion judge in the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
- After a jury-waived trial, Narcisse was convicted on both charges.
- Narcisse (appellant) appealed the convictions to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, challenging the denial of his suppression motion.
- The Appeals Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and the convictions.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted Narcisse's application for further appellate review.
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Issue:
Does a police pat-frisk of an individual during a consensual encounter, based on general environmental factors and officer safety concerns but without a reasonable suspicion of specific criminal activity, violate the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights?
Opinions:
Majority - Cordy, J.
Yes, the pat-frisk violates the Fourth Amendment and Article 14. To justify escalating a consensual encounter to a stop and frisk, police must satisfy both prongs of the test established in Terry v. Ohio: (1) a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and (2) a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. The court's prior decision in Commonwealth v. Fraser, which suggested a frisk could be justified on safety grounds alone, is no longer to be interpreted as an exception to this two-pronged requirement. Here, the factors relied upon—Narcisse's presence in a high-crime area, his hometown being Randolph (where a recent homicide occurred), an 'implausible' answer, and general concerns of retaliatory violence—do not, individually or collectively, create a reasonable suspicion that Narcisse himself was engaged in criminal activity. Because the first prong of the Terry test was not met, the seizure and subsequent frisk were unconstitutional.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and strengthens stop-and-frisk jurisprudence in Massachusetts by explicitly closing a potential loophole from the earlier Commonwealth v. Fraser case. It holds that officer safety concerns alone cannot justify a pat-frisk during a consensual encounter; police must first have an independent, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. By mandating adherence to both prongs of the Terry v. Ohio standard in such situations, the ruling reinforces the principle that generalized suspicion or presence in a high-crime area is insufficient to strip an individual of their Fourth Amendment protections. This precedent makes it more difficult for police to escalate consensual field interrogations into intrusive searches without specific evidence of wrongdoing.
