Commonwealth v. Mixer
207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249, 1910 Mass. LEXIS 736 (1910)
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Rule of Law:
For public welfare offenses created under a legislature's police power, a person can be held criminally liable for the prohibited act itself, regardless of their knowledge or criminal intent.
Facts:
- The defendant, Mixer, was a driver employed by a common carrier.
- Mixer transported a sugar barrel into the city of Lynn, a municipality where licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquor were not granted and where a permit was required to transport such liquor.
- The sugar barrel, which was not marked as containing alcohol by the sender, secretly contained intoxicating liquor.
- There was nothing about the barrel's appearance to arouse suspicion as to its contents.
- Mixer was ignorant of the fact that the barrel contained intoxicating liquor.
Procedural Posture:
- The Commonwealth charged Mixer in the Superior Court with illegally transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of St. 1906, c. 421.
- At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction that he must be acquitted unless the jury found he knew, or had reasonable cause to know, that the barrel contained intoxicating liquor.
- The presiding trial judge refused to give the requested instruction.
- The defendant appealed the trial judge's refusal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts by filing a bill of exceptions.
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Issue:
Does a statute prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor into a 'no license' municipality require proof that the defendant knew the package contained intoxicating liquor to secure a conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Rugg, J.
No. A defendant can be convicted under the statute without proof of knowledge or intent because the legislature, in exercising its police power, may prohibit a specific act and make its performance a crime regardless of the actor's intent. The court identified this as a public welfare offense, where the act itself, not the mental state, constitutes the crime. Tracing the history of liquor transportation statutes, the court noted the legislature's increasing stringency and the deliberate omission of words like 'knowingly' or 'willfully,' which indicates an intent to create a strict liability offense. This places the burden on the carrier to ascertain the contents of packages they transport, implicitly granting them the right to inspect goods to avoid criminal liability.
Analysis:
This case is a foundational example of a 'public welfare offense,' establishing that for certain regulatory crimes intended to protect public health, safety, and morals, the traditional common law requirement of mens rea (a guilty mind) is not an element of the crime. This decision solidifies the doctrine of strict liability, placing a significant burden on individuals and businesses engaged in regulated activities to ensure absolute compliance with the law. It affirms that ignorance of a material fact is not a defense when the legislature has determined that the public good requires holding actors accountable for the act itself.
