Commonwealth v. Mercado
420 Pa. Super. 588, 617 A.2d 342, 1992 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4117 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
An individual's mere presence at a location where a crime is committed, coupled with their subsequent presence in a non-exclusive area where contraband is later found, is insufficient to prove constructive possession or criminal conspiracy without additional evidence demonstrating control over the contraband or an agreement to commit the crime.
Facts:
- On April 5, 1989, an undercover police officer purchased two vials of crack cocaine from Alex Colon at the front door of a row house at 707 West Berks Street using a pre-recorded ten-dollar bill.
- During this transaction, the officer observed appellant, Mercado, leaning out of a third-floor window directly above, watching silently.
- The officer returned twice within the next fifteen minutes and again saw Colon at the door and Mercado leaning out the window, but witnessed no further criminal activity.
- Two days later, on April 7, 1990, police executed a search warrant for the premises.
- Upon entering, officers encountered Mercado on the stairs between the first and second floors.
- In an open and unlocked third-floor room, police found significant quantities of cocaine, crack cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and $3,128 in cash, which included the pre-recorded ten-dollar bill from the earlier drug buy.
- No drugs were found on Mercado's person, and no personal items or documents linked him to the third-floor apartment.
Procedural Posture:
- Mercado was charged with possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver and criminal conspiracy.
- Following a bench trial in the court of first instance, Mercado was convicted on both counts.
- Mercado's post-trial motions were denied by the trial court.
- The trial court sentenced Mercado to three-to-six years incarceration for possession and a concurrent term of one-to-five years for conspiracy.
- Mercado appealed the judgment of sentence to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does an individual's silent observation of a drug transaction from a third-floor window, combined with their presence in the same house two days later when drugs are discovered in that non-exclusive, unlocked third-floor room, constitute sufficient evidence to prove constructive possession and criminal conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt?
Opinions:
Majority - Hoffman, J.
No. The evidence presented was insufficient to support a conviction for constructive possession or criminal conspiracy. To prove constructive possession, the Commonwealth must show the defendant had the ability and intent to exercise conscious dominion over the contraband. Here, Mercado's mere presence in the house and his prior observation of a drug deal are not enough. The Commonwealth failed to show Mercado had exclusive access to the unlocked third-floor apartment; where access is not exclusive, mere presence is insufficient to prove conscious dominion. The evidence gives rise only to suspicion or conjecture, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, a criminal conspiracy requires an agreement to commit an unlawful act. Mercado's silent observation from the window, without any evidence of communication or participation, is insufficient to infer an agreement with Colon. Mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge of its commission do not establish a conspiracy.
Dissenting - Cirillo, J.
Yes. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for possession and conspiracy. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the totality of the circumstances supports the conviction. Mercado was observed acting as a lookout from the third-floor window on two occasions, including during the controlled buy. Two days later, he was found in the house, and a large quantity of drugs and the pre-recorded buy money were found in that same 'lookout' room. This evidence is sufficient to prove that the contraband was in an area of joint control and access, establishing constructive possession. Furthermore, Mercado’s role as a lookout was an integral part of the drug dealing operation, from which a conspiratorial agreement can be reasonably inferred.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the legal principle that guilt by association is not a valid basis for a criminal conviction. It clarifies the high evidentiary bar for proving constructive possession and conspiracy based solely on circumstantial evidence. The decision emphasizes that to establish constructive possession in a shared space, the prosecution must present evidence directly linking the defendant to the contraband beyond their mere presence. For conspiracy, the court requires more than observation and proximity to infer an agreement, thereby protecting individuals from convictions based on suspicion or conjecture arising from their presence at a crime scene.
