Commonwealth vs. George P. McLaughlin
364 Mass. 211, 303 N.E.2d 338 (1973)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's out-of-court statement that inculpates the defendant does not violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause under the Bruton rule if the statement falls within a well-established, firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, such as the spontaneous exclamation exception.
Facts:
- On the evening of March 14, 1964, George McLaughlin, William Sheridan, and Maureen Dellamano attended a party in an apartment building where Dellamano also resided.
- After an altercation in the building's hallway, McLaughlin left the party with Dellamano and entered her first-floor apartment.
- A witness, Herbert Josselyn, saw McLaughlin pull out a pistol and shoot Sheridan in the doorway of the building.
- Immediately after a shot was heard, Dellamano ran back into the second-floor party apartment, appearing hysterical and nervous.
- Several witnesses inside the apartment heard Dellamano exclaim words to the effect of "George shot someone" or "George did it."
Procedural Posture:
- George McLaughlin was indicted for first-degree murder, and Maureen Dellamano was indicted as an accessory after the fact.
- The Commonwealth's motion for a joint trial was granted by the state trial court.
- At trial, the court admitted testimony that Dellamano exclaimed "George shot someone" immediately after the shooting occurred.
- The trial judge ultimately instructed the jury to consider Dellamano's statement as evidence only against her and not against McLaughlin.
- A jury found McLaughlin guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction on direct appeal in 1967.
- In 1970, McLaughlin filed a motion for a new trial in the trial court, arguing the admission of Dellamano's statement violated the rule from Bruton v. United States (1968).
- The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, and McLaughlin appealed that denial to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's out-of-court statement inculpating the defendant violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton v. United States, when the statement qualifies as a spontaneous exclamation and is thus an exception to the hearsay rule?
Opinions:
Majority - Quirico, J.
No. The admission of the statement does not violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. The rule from Bruton v. United States, which bars the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's incriminating confession in a joint trial even with a limiting instruction, explicitly does not apply when the statement is admissible against the defendant under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Dellamano's statement, made seconds after the shocking event of the shooting while she was hysterical, qualifies as a "spontaneous exclamation." This is a firmly rooted hearsay exception based on the theory that such utterances are trustworthy because they are made without time for reflection or fabrication. Because the statement would have been admissible against McLaughlin even if he had been tried alone, its admission in a joint trial does not create a Confrontation Clause violation, and the Bruton rule is inapplicable.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant limitation on the scope of the Bruton rule, clarifying that the Confrontation Clause is not an absolute bar to all inculpatory hearsay from a co-defendant. It confirms that the reliability inherent in certain well-established hearsay exceptions, such as spontaneous exclamations, can satisfy the constitutional concerns underlying the right to confrontation. This allows for the admission of such statements in joint trials, preventing the automatic severance that might otherwise be required under Bruton. The decision distinguishes between presumptively unreliable accomplice confessions, which Bruton targets, and other types of out-of-court statements that carry their own indicia of reliability.
