Commonwealth v. Markman
2007 Pa. LEXIS 387, 591 Pa. 249, 916 A.2d 586 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Admitting a non-testifying co-defendant's confession that is obviously redacted to replace the defendant's name violates the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. The statutory defense of duress is available for a first-degree murder charge and requires a jury instruction if supported by evidence, unless the defendant's reckless self-placement into the situation is undisputed.
Facts:
- Leslie White began a romantic relationship with William Housman, who was cohabiting with Beth Ann Markman.
- After Markman discovered the affair, she and Housman had escalating arguments, and Markman was seen with bruises she attributed to Housman.
- Markman expressed anger toward White, telling friends and co-workers that she would 'kick her ass' or 'kill her'.
- On October 4, 2000, Markman drove Housman to a pay phone, where Housman called White and falsely stated his father had died to lure her to their trailer.
- When White arrived at the trailer, Markman and Housman acted together to subdue her by binding her hands and feet with speaker wire and placing a gag in and over her mouth.
- Markman held White down while Housman strangled her with speaker wire and his arm, causing her death by asphyxiation.
- After the killing, Markman and Housman wrapped White's body in a tent, placed it in White's Jeep, and drove to Virginia.
- In Virginia, they disposed of White's body in an abandoned car and sold her camera to a pawn shop.
Procedural Posture:
- Beth Ann Markman was tried jointly with co-defendant William Housman in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas (the trial court of first instance).
- The trial court denied Markman's pre-trial motion to sever her trial from Housman's.
- During the trial, the court overruled Markman's objection to the admission of Housman's audiotaped confession, which had been redacted by dubbing over her name.
- The trial court refused Markman's request for a jury instruction on the defense of duress.
- The jury found Markman guilty on all charges, including first-degree murder.
- After the penalty phase, the jury found one aggravating circumstance outweighed two mitigating circumstances and returned a sentence of death.
- The trial court formally imposed the death sentence, from which Markman filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does admitting a non-testifying co-defendant's audiotaped confession, where the defendant's name is replaced by an obviously dubbed-in phrase like 'the other person,' violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Saylor
Yes, admitting the redacted audiotape violated Markman's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. Under Bruton v. United States and Gray v. Maryland, redactions that replace a name with an obvious blank, symbol, or other phrase that notifies the jury of the deletion are unconstitutional. Here, the use of a different voice to dub in 'the other person' was an obvious alteration that directly implicated Markman, especially since the trial court explicitly told the jury the tape was altered. This error was not harmless because the central issue at trial was Markman's intent and her claim of coercion, and Housman's confession was the only direct evidence portraying her as the instigator who forced him to act, making it highly prejudicial. The court also held that the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on the defense of duress, as the statutory defense is available for first-degree murder and Markman had presented sufficient evidence of coercion to create a question of fact for the jury.
Dissenting - Justice Eakin
No, the conviction should not be reversed because the error was harmless. While admitting the obviously redacted tape was a Bruton violation, the evidence of Markman's guilt was overwhelming. Her prior threats against the victim, her active participation in luring, binding, and killing her, and her subsequent actions to conceal the crime negated any significant prejudicial impact from the confession. Furthermore, since Markman confessed to her involvement, the impact of her co-defendant's statement was less devastating. The trial court also correctly refused the duress instruction because the statutory exception for recklessly placing oneself in a situation where duress is probable applied as a matter of law. Markman had numerous, undisputed opportunities to escape Housman's control before, during, and after the crime, but she repeatedly chose to remain with him, which constitutes recklessness.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Gray v. Maryland to audio confessions, establishing that obvious dubbing is constitutionally equivalent to leaving a blank space in a written statement. More significantly, the case sets a major precedent in Pennsylvania by holding that the statutory defense of duress is available against a charge of first-degree murder, overturning the common law rule. This provides a critical defensive strategy for defendants in capital cases who can produce evidence of coercion, shifting the factual determination of both the duress claim and any alleged recklessness to the jury unless the evidence is entirely one-sided.
