Commonwealth v. Long
152 N.E.3d 725 (2020)
Rule of Law:
A defendant may raise a reasonable inference that a traffic stop was unconstitutionally motivated by race by pointing to specific facts from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, without needing to present statistical analysis. Once such an inference is raised, the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to prove that the stop was not racially motivated.
Facts:
- Around 11 A.M. on November 28, 2017, two plainclothes Boston police officers from the youth violence strike force were in an unmarked vehicle on a residential street.
- Edward Long, a young Black man, drove a maroon Mercedes SUV past the officers.
- The officers, without observing any traffic violation, decided to follow Long and run his vehicle's license plate number in their computer.
- The query revealed that the vehicle was registered to a Black woman and lacked a current inspection sticker.
- The officers initiated a traffic stop of Long's vehicle based on the missing inspection sticker.
- After stopping Long, the officers learned his license was suspended and he had two outstanding warrants.
- The officers arrested Long, decided to impound the vehicle, and conducted a search prior to towing.
- During the pre-towing search, an officer discovered a firearm in a bag on the rear passenger seat.
Procedural Posture:
- Edward Long was charged with several firearms offenses in the Superior Court Department.
- Long filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle, arguing the stop resulted from selective enforcement based on race.
- After an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the motion to suppress, ruling Long had not met his burden to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination under existing precedent.
- Long sought leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal, which a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk allowed.
- The single justice reported the appeal to be heard by the full Supreme Judicial Court.
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Issue:
Does a defendant raise a reasonable inference of an unconstitutional, racially motivated traffic stop by pointing to specific facts from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, even without presenting statistical evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Gaziano, J.
Yes. A defendant raises a reasonable inference of an unconstitutional, racially motivated traffic stop by pointing to specific facts from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, without needing statistical evidence. The court concluded that the prior standard established in Commonwealth v. Lora (2008), which required defendants to produce statistical evidence, set an impossibly high bar that rendered the right to be free from racial profiling illusory. To remedy this, the court established a new test where a defendant's motion to suppress can raise a reasonable inference of discrimination based on the circumstances of the stop itself. If a defendant makes this showing, they are entitled to a hearing where the Commonwealth bears the burden of rebutting the inference by proving the stop was not motivated by race. The court also held that, even under the old Lora standard, the defendant's statistical evidence was sufficient and the lower court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress.
Concurring - Gants, C.J.
Agrees with the majority's revised equal protection test and its conclusion. He also agrees with Justice Budd that a stop violating equal protection is also an 'unreasonable' seizure under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. However, he declines to join Justice Budd's opinion because he would not decide in this case whether all pretextual stops, even those not based on race, also violate art. 14, as that broader question was not at issue.
Concurring - Budd, J.
Agrees that the Lora standard was too high and that the defendant's evidence was sufficient. However, argues the court's equal protection analysis is a 'partial work-around' for the systemic problem of pretextual stops. Proposes that all pretextual stops—where an officer uses a minor traffic violation as an excuse to investigate an unrelated hunch without reasonable suspicion—are unconstitutional under art. 14's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Advocates for a 'would have' test, where a stop is only valid if a reasonable officer would have made it solely for the traffic violation, regardless of any other motive.
Concurring - Cypher, J.
Agrees with the majority's revised test but emphasizes two points. First, the racial profiling analysis should begin with the officer's initial decision to query a license plate, as a race-based decision to run a plate can violate equal protection even if the query itself is not a search. Second, she notes that the problem of racial profiling is systemic and requires a systemic solution involving all branches of government, not just the judiciary.
Analysis:
This decision significantly lowers the evidentiary burden for defendants claiming racial profiling in traffic stops in Massachusetts, making such constitutional challenges more viable. By moving away from a rigid, statistics-based standard to a more flexible 'totality of the circumstances' analysis, the court acknowledges the practical difficulties defendants face in obtaining police data and the role of implicit bias. This ruling will likely increase the frequency of suppression motions based on selective enforcement and require courts to more closely scrutinize the specific facts and officer motivations behind routine traffic stops, rather than just their technical legality.
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