Commonwealth v. Lockwood
122 N.E.3d 1078, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 189 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
The statutory phrase "no person lawfully therein being put in fear" in G. L. c. 266, § 18, is a "nonelement-creating differentiation" distinguishing it from a more serious offense, rather than an affirmative element the Commonwealth must prove. A necessity defense for parental kidnapping is unavailable when a defendant has effective legal alternatives to address perceived dangers to children in state custody.
Facts:
- The defendant, a United States citizen, had two children, S.L. and P.L., with a Vietnamese woman while living in Vietnam; the children's mother later moved to Switzerland.
- In August 2011, the defendant moved to Massachusetts with the children, but the Department of Children and Families (DCF) removed them from his custody after a motel manager reported they were being left alone.
- DCF was awarded permanent custody of the children on March 1, 2013, and scheduled a hearing for May 29, 2013, to transfer their custody to their mother in Switzerland.
- Nine days before the scheduled hearing, the defendant, who was only permitted supervised visits and not allowed to know the foster home's location, followed a DCF employee driving the children back to their foster home.
- The defendant's car was packed with items associated with a long trip, including clothes, camping gear, and an iPad showing driving directions to Pennsylvania.
- When P.L. came out to play, he spotted the defendant and ran back inside, alerting the 63-year-old foster mother.
- The defendant chased P.L. onto the porch, pushed the foster mother aside to enter the kitchen, grabbed P.L., pulled him out of the house, and forced both P.L. and S.L. into his car.
- The defendant drove the children away and was apprehended later that night in Connecticut after an Amber alert was issued.
Procedural Posture:
- The Department of Children and Families (DCF) took custody of the defendant's two minor children and placed them in a foster home.
- On March 1, 2013, a judge of the Juvenile Court Department issued "Care and Protection DCF Commitment Mittimus" orders, granting permanent custody of the children to DCF until adulthood.
- DCF subsequently moved to transfer custody of the children to their mother in Switzerland, with a hearing scheduled for May 29, 2013.
- The defendant was charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, two counts of aggravated parental kidnapping, assault and battery upon a person over sixty, and battery on a child.
- The defendant represented himself at a jury trial in which he was convicted of the aforementioned charges, but acquitted of assault with intent to commit a felony and reckless endangerment of a child.
- The defendant filed a posttrial motion seeking portions of the audio recording of the trial, which was denied in part.
- The defendant appealed his convictions and the partial denial of his posttrial motion to the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
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Issue:
Does the statutory phrase "no person lawfully therein being put in fear" in G. L. c. 266, § 18, constitute an element of the offense that the Commonwealth must affirmatively prove, and does a defendant seeking a necessity defense for parental kidnapping satisfy the element of lacking legal alternatives when ongoing custody proceedings are available?
Opinions:
Majority - WolohOjian, J.
No, the phrase "no person lawfully therein being put in fear" in G. L. c. 266, § 18, is not an essential element the Commonwealth must prove, and no, the defendant was not entitled to a necessity defense for parental kidnapping because effective legal alternatives were available. The court reasoned that interpreting "no person lawfully therein being put in fear" as an affirmative element would lead to absurd results where proving that fear was present would make it impossible to convict under the less serious statute (§ 18), effectively punishing a defendant less for causing more harm. Instead, this phrase serves as a "nonelement-creating differentiation" to distinguish § 18 from the more serious crime of breaking and entering with fear under G. L. c. 266, § 17, consistent with prior case law. Regarding the necessity defense, the court found that the defendant's perceived dangers (psychological harm, potential brain surgery, relocation to Vietnam) were not ones that could only be effectively cured by forcefully removing the children. The court emphasized that these issues were "susceptible to abatement through legal alternatives," specifically the ongoing custody proceedings in Juvenile Court. The defendant failed to meet the burden of proving the absence of legal alternatives, as his own testimony showed he was pursuing such options. The court also affirmed that compelling another person to open a closed door, even through fear, constitutes a "breaking," and any alleged error in the "person as obstruction" instruction was nonprejudicial. It further held that jury instructions adequately conveyed the requirement of felonious intent at the time of breaking and entering, and that a lesser included offense instruction for misdemeanor parental kidnapping was not warranted given the evidence of intent for felony aggravated kidnapping. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in excluding a collateral attack on the Juvenile Court custody orders during the criminal trial, or in limiting access to trial audio recordings to specific identified inaccuracies.
Analysis:
This case offers critical clarification on statutory interpretation, establishing that negative qualifiers like "no person...being put in fear" in criminal statutes may function as sentencing differentiators rather than affirmative elements of the offense. This prevents illogical outcomes where the presence of a more serious harm could unintentionally negate an element of a lesser crime. Furthermore, the decision underscores the narrow application of the necessity defense in parental kidnapping, reinforcing the principle that legal avenues for resolving custody disputes must be exhausted before self-help remedies are considered, thereby upholding the authority of child welfare agencies and court orders. It clarifies that even actions compelled by fear can constitute a "breaking," demonstrating the breadth of this element in burglary-related offenses.
