Commonwealth v. Lewin

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
542 N.E.2d 275, 405 Mass. 566 (1989)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Egregious police misconduct, such as perjury and fabricating evidence, does not require the dismissal of indictments unless it results in irremediable prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial, or if dismissal is necessary for prophylactic reasons to deter future misconduct.


Facts:

  • On February 17, 1988, Boston police officer Carlos A. Luna applied for a search warrant for a third-floor apartment at 102 Bellevue Street.
  • In the sworn application, Luna claimed a reliable informant named 'John' reported an Hispanic male named 'Stevie' was selling cocaine from the apartment, and that Luna himself had made two controlled drug buys there.
  • During the attempt to execute the warrant, Detective Sherman C. Griffiths was shot and killed by shots fired from inside the target apartment.
  • Police forced their way into the empty apartment and subsequently found the defendant, Albert Lewin, a black Jamaican male, in a first-floor apartment along with several other individuals.
  • A gun found in the first-floor apartment, which witnesses said Lewin had possessed, was determined to be the weapon that killed Griffiths.
  • It was later revealed that Officer Luna had fabricated the existence of the informant 'John' and had lied under oath about making the drug buys himself.
  • The information regarding the drug buys and the description of 'Stevie' had been derived from other, undisclosed informants.
  • Police also failed to timely disclose the existence of another informant, 'X,' whose testimony would be exculpatory for Lewin by placing other men at the scene moments before the shooting.

Procedural Posture:

  • The Commonwealth charged Albert Lewin with murder in the District Court.
  • Following a probable cause hearing where charges against others were dismissed, probable cause was found against Lewin.
  • A Suffolk County grand jury indicted Lewin for murder and other related offenses.
  • In the Superior Court, the defense moved for the disclosure of the confidential informant 'John,' and the motion was allowed.
  • The court ordered the Commonwealth to produce 'John,' but it failed to do so.
  • Lewin moved to dismiss the indictments, which the Superior Court judge granted, finding 'deliberate and egregious inaction by the Commonwealth.'
  • The Commonwealth moved for reconsideration, presenting new evidence that police officers had committed perjury and that 'John' never existed.
  • The Superior Court judge reconsidered the matter but reaffirmed his decision to dismiss the indictments due to the pervasive misconduct.
  • The Commonwealth appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

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Issue:

Does egregious and perjurious police misconduct that does not result in irremediable prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial require dismissal of the indictments?


Opinions:

Majority - Wilkins, J.

No, egregious police misconduct does not require dismissal of the indictments if it does not cause irremediable prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial. The court distinguishes between two grounds for dismissal: 1) irremediable harm to the defendant's right to a fair trial, and 2) egregious, deliberate misconduct so severe that it requires dismissal for prophylactic reasons. Here, the defendant has not suffered irremediable harm because the informant 'John,' whose testimony was sought, was non-existent. Therefore, no exculpatory witness is actually being withheld. While the police conduct was 'reprehensible,' 'contemptible,' and 'disgusting,' dismissal is not required as a prophylactic measure. The officers' careers are over and they face serious criminal charges, which provides a sufficient deterrent to future misconduct. Society should not punish itself by dismissing serious murder charges when a fair trial, though difficult, remains possible.


Dissenting - Liacos, C.J.

Yes, the indictments should be dismissed. The prosecutorial team's misconduct was so 'egregious, deliberate, and intentional' that it created presumptive prejudice and poisoned the proceedings beyond cure, making a fair trial impossible. The majority improperly acts as a fact-finder by overturning the motion judge's finding that the exculpatory informant 'John' does exist and is being deliberately withheld. The police officers have every incentive to continue lying to secure a conviction and justify their past actions. The only effective remedy to deter such 'deliberate and insidious attempts to subvert the defendant's right to a fair trial' is the dismissal of the indictments.


Dissenting - Abrams, J.

Yes, the indictments should be dismissed. The court alters precedent by now requiring both egregious conduct and irremediable harm, whereas the standard allows dismissal for either. The majority improperly substitutes its own credibility judgment for that of the trial judge, who saw the witnesses and was warranted in finding that 'John' exists and that the officers' recantations were not credible. The police misconduct was so 'outrageous, egregious, and calculated' that dismissal is required as a prophylactic measure to deter such behavior in the future and to protect the integrity of the justice system. The court's tepid response tolerates and encourages police illegality.



Analysis:

This decision establishes a very high threshold for dismissing criminal indictments based on police or prosecutorial misconduct in Massachusetts. It bifurcates the analysis into prejudice-based and prophylactic-based dismissals, ultimately prioritizing society's interest in prosecuting serious crimes over using dismissal as a tool to punish police misconduct. The ruling suggests that as long as a defendant can theoretically receive a fair trial—even if tainted by police lies—and other deterrents exist (such as criminal prosecution of the officers), the charges will stand. This significantly narrows the circumstances under which the 'drastic remedy' of dismissal is available for even the most egregious official misconduct.

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