Commonwealth v. Jones
880 S.W.2d 544, 1994 WL 141015 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A conviction for disorderly conduct based on making 'unreasonable noise' does not violate free speech principles if it is based on the volume, time, place, and nature of the expression, rather than solely on the offensive content of the words used.
Facts:
- During the 1991 Pegasus Parade in Louisville, Kentucky, an individual named Jones began shouting obscenities at military components featured in the parade.
- A mother with four young children complained about Jones's language to City Police Officer Phillips.
- Officer Phillips approached Jones, told her the language was impermissible, and instructed her to move out of a designated red-lined 'safety zone'.
- Jones refused the officer's order to move from the safety zone.
- Jones then called Officer Phillips a 'Nazi pig motherfucker'.
Procedural Posture:
- Jones was charged with disorderly conduct and tried in Jefferson District Court, a trial court of first instance.
- A jury found Jones guilty of disorderly conduct.
- Jones appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction.
- Jones then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, an intermediate appellate court, which reversed the conviction.
- The Commonwealth of Kentucky then appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the state's highest court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is there sufficient evidence to convict an individual for disorderly conduct for making 'unreasonable noise' and creating a 'hazardous or physically offensive condition' at a public parade, when the conduct involves shouting obscenities and refusing a police officer's order, without punishing the protected content of the speech itself?
Opinions:
Majority - Reynolds, Justice
Yes. A rational jury could find the essential elements of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, as the conviction is supported by the defendant's conduct and not just the content of her speech. The jury could determine that Jones's 'noise' was unreasonable based on the officer's testimony about her volume, the public setting with children present, and her voice escalation after being confronted. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and under this standard, substantial evidence supported the conviction. Jones's refusal to move from a safety zone combined with her shouting could also be reasonably interpreted by a jury as creating a 'hazardous or physically offensive condition' that served 'no legitimate purpose' under the statute. Therefore, the conviction punishes disruptive conduct, not protected speech.
Dissenting - Stumbo, Justice
No. The conviction should be overturned because it impermissibly punishes the defendant for the content of her speech rather than her conduct. A parade is an appropriate venue for loud expression, whether of approval or disapproval. The arresting officer only testified that Jones's voice was 'greater than a normal speaking voice,' not that it was unreasonably loud for the circumstances of a parade. Therefore, her arrest was primarily due to the unpopular, anti-military content of her speech and the obscenities directed at the officer. Yelling at a parade does not create a 'hazardous or physically offensive condition,' and to suggest it does is to improperly focus on the content of the words, which the majority concedes is not punishable.
Analysis:
This case illustrates the critical distinction between regulating the content of speech, which is highly protected by the First Amendment, and regulating the conduct associated with speech. The decision reinforces that states can constitutionally prohibit 'disorderly conduct' that disrupts public order, even when that conduct involves speech. It establishes that factors like volume, location, and non-compliance with lawful police orders can transform otherwise protected expression into punishable conduct. This precedent gives law enforcement and juries latitude to assess the 'reasonableness' of expression based on the totality of the circumstances, which may be criticized for potentially chilling speech that is merely unpopular or offensive.
