Commonwealth v. Hutchins
575 N.E.2d 741 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
The common law defense of necessity is not available as a defense to charges of cultivating or possessing marihuana, even for medicinal purposes, because the potential harm to the public from undermining drug enforcement laws is judicially determined to outweigh the defendant's individual interest in alleviating medical symptoms.
Facts:
- The defendant, a Navy veteran, was diagnosed with scleroderma accompanied by Raynaud’s phenomenon, a chronic and incurable disease.
- His severe symptoms included extreme pain, weight loss, nausea, difficulty swallowing, and depression, for which numerous conventional medical treatments were ineffective.
- At one point, a physician advised the surgical removal of his esophagus.
- Since 1975, the defendant used marihuana to successfully alleviate his symptoms, which two of his treating physicians observed and documented.
- The defendant made numerous, unsuccessful attempts to lawfully obtain marihuana for his condition through his physicians, the Veterans Administration, and by seeking inclusion in a research study.
- The Massachusetts Legislature had considered but not enacted any statutes permitting the therapeutic use of marihuana.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was convicted of drug offenses at a bench trial in the District Court.
- He requested a jury trial de novo in a jury session of the District Court.
- The charges were amended and later reduced to simple possession or cultivation of THC and marihuana.
- Before trial, the defendant filed a motion asking the court to rule on the availability of the medical necessity defense as a matter of law.
- The judge in the jury session denied the motion, ruling that the defendant would not be allowed to introduce evidence of medical necessity.
- The defendant then waived his right to a jury trial, was convicted at a subsequent bench trial, and appealed his convictions.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case from the Appeals Court on its own initiative.
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Issue:
Does the common law defense of medical necessity excuse a defendant's cultivation and possession of marihuana for the purpose of alleviating symptoms of a serious medical condition?
Opinions:
Majority - O'Connor, J.
No. The common law defense of necessity is not available for cultivating and possessing marihuana for medical purposes because the public interest in enforcing drug control laws outweighs the individual's need for medical relief. The court must first conduct a threshold balancing test to determine if the harm avoided by the defendant's illegal conduct 'clearly and significantly' outweighs the potential public harm that would result from recognizing the defense. Here, unlike in cases of prison escape from imminent danger or temporary gun possession for self-defense, the harm to the public is significant. Allowing a medical necessity defense would have a 'reasonably possible negative impact' on the enforcement of drug laws and would undermine the 'government’s overriding interest in the regulation of such substances.' Therefore, the defense fails this threshold 'competing harms' analysis, and it is unnecessary to proceed to the traditional four-factor test for necessity.
Dissenting - Liacos, C.J.
Yes. The defense of medical necessity should be available for a jury to consider when a defendant offers sufficient proof that they used marihuana to alleviate symptoms of a serious illness. The majority engages in 'speculative judicial fact finding' by balancing the competing harms itself rather than allowing a jury to perform its function. The 'superseding value' at stake is the 'humanitarian and compassionate' interest in allowing an individual to seek relief from agonizing symptoms, which outweighs society's generalized interest in drug prohibition in these limited circumstances. The defendant's offer of proof satisfied all four elements of the necessity defense: he faced a clear danger, his action was effective in abating it, he had no legal alternative, and the legislature had not precluded the defense. By refusing to allow this evidence, the court improperly prevented the jury from exercising its vital function of tempering the law with common sense.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant limitation on the common law necessity defense in the context of drug crimes in Massachusetts. By creating a threshold 'competing harms' test to be decided by the judge as a matter of law, the court effectively foreclosed the medical necessity defense for marihuana use, prioritizing the state's public policy interest in uniform drug law enforcement over an individual's compelling medical circumstances. This ruling shifted the resolution of the medical marihuana issue from the judiciary to the legislature, establishing that any change in the law must come from statutory enactment rather than common law evolution. The case is a key example of judicial deference to legislative policy in the highly regulated area of controlled substances.
