Commonwealth v. Hood
1983 Mass. LEXIS 1544, 389 Mass. 581, 452 N.E.2d 188 (1983)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
First Amendment free speech and assembly rights, and analogous state constitutional rights, generally do not apply to privately owned commercial property unless the property serves a broad public function; furthermore, the “competing harms” (necessity) defense to trespass requires a clear and imminent danger, a direct causal link, the absence of legal alternatives, and no legislative preclusion.
Facts:
- On December 21, 1981, approximately thirty people gathered in a public park across the street from the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. (Draper) in Cambridge.
- At 8:00 a.m., the group crossed the street and entered an outdoor courtyard on Draper premises.
- A Draper security officer ordered the group to leave, and all but the four defendants (Hood, Hillegass, et al.) complied.
- Security officers then asked each defendant to leave, informed them they would be arrested if they did not, and two “No Trespassing” signs were posted in the courtyard.
- The defendants remained on the premises, attempting to pass out leaflets to Draper employees that advocated nonviolence as a means to avert nuclear war.
- Three Cambridge police officers arrived and informed the defendants they were trespassing and would be arrested if they did not leave.
- The defendants remained and were arrested about 8:30 a.m.
- Draper leased and maintained the premises, which were bounded by public roads and railroad tracks, allowing pedestrians and cars to pass through, but the defendants were asked to leave because they were distributing leaflets.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendants were charged with trespassing under G. L. c. 266, § 120.
- Prior to the trial, the Commonwealth filed motions in limine requesting the judge exclude evidence of the defendants’ reasons for being on the premises (distributing leaflets and their content), which the motion judge allowed.
- A jury trial was held in a District Court, where the defendants were convicted of trespassing.
- The fines of $50 for each defendant were suspended pending appeal.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took the cases on its own motion.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the First Amendment, or similar state constitutional provisions, protect individuals distributing leaflets on private business property, and can the “competing harms” defense justify trespass motivated by political protest against nuclear weapons development?
Opinions:
Majority - Hennessey, C.J.
No, the defendants' convictions for trespassing did not violate their constitutional rights, nor was the “competing harms” defense applicable, because Draper's private property did not constitute a public forum, and their actions did not meet the stringent criteria for the necessity defense. The court affirmed that First and Fourteenth Amendment rights apply to government action, not private action. While state constitutional rights (Art. 9) might apply to private property under specific circumstances (e.g., ballot access in large shopping malls), this does not extend to general free speech on a private business's property like Draper, which does not serve a broad public function akin to a “company town” or a large shopping mall. The fact that the public was allowed to pass through Draper’s property did not alter its essential private nature. Furthermore, the court found no symbiotic relationship with the government simply from alleged government contract work, nor did the judicial enforcement of a trespass statute constitute impermissible state enforcement of private discrimination as in Shelley v. Kraemer. The Richardson implied license theory was inapplicable due to posted no-trespassing signs and direct orders to leave. Crucially, the “competing harms” defense was unavailable because the defendants’ actions of distributing leaflets to protest the nuclear arms race did not meet the requirements of a direct causal link to abating an imminent danger and the absence of legal alternatives (e.g., using publicity media, distributing literature at an appropriate site, or participating in the political process). Although motions in limine to exclude a defense should ordinarily be used cautiously, the defendants were not prejudiced because their evidence, even if introduced, would not have supported a legally viable competing harms defense.
Concurring - Liacos, J.
Yes, the allowance of a motion in limine to bar evidence for a necessity defense could constitute reversible error if the offer of proof is sufficient, but in this case, the defendants' offer of proof was insufficient, thus rendering the error nonprejudicial. Justice Liacos agreed with the majority’s ultimate conclusion but stated that its reasoning regarding motions in limine swept too broadly. He emphasized that the indiscriminate use of motions in limine to “choke off a valid defense” raises serious constitutional questions about a defendant's right to present a defense and undermines the jury's role. If a defendant offers sufficient facts to establish each element of a legally viable defense, it is reversible error to disallow evidence. However, in this case, the defendants’ offer of proof only addressed two elements of the necessity defense (clear and imminent danger and reasonable expectation of effectiveness) but failed to show that there were no legal alternatives or that the Legislature had not precluded the defense. Because the defendants' offer of proof did not demonstrate that they would introduce sufficient evidence on each element of the defense, they were not prejudiced by their inability to present their evidence to the jury.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits the application of First Amendment rights and analogous state constitutional protections on private commercial property, reinforcing the distinction between public forums and privately owned spaces, even if accessible to the public. It also solidifies the stringent requirements for the necessity or competing harms defense, particularly in contexts of political protest against broad societal issues. The court's ruling underscores that such a defense is generally inapplicable when the danger is not imminent, the defendant's action lacks a direct causal link to abating the harm, or legal alternatives exist. This decision guides future courts in screening necessity defenses and clarifies the judicial role in managing the admissibility of evidence for such defenses, preventing juries from considering legally insufficient arguments.
