Commonwealth vs. Albert Henson, Jr.
394 Mass. 584, 476 N.E.2d 947 (1985)
Rule of Law:
A defendant has a right to impeach a prosecution witness for bias by cross-examining them about pending criminal charges. Additionally, for crimes requiring a specific criminal intent, such as assault with intent to murder, the jury may consider evidence of the defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining whether the prosecution has proven that intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Facts:
- The defendant was a passenger in a car driven by his girlfriend, Regina DiBlasio, with Lori Newton in the back seat.
- The defendant had been drinking alcoholic beverages before getting into the vehicle.
- DiBlasio identified a pedestrian, Ernest Hill, as someone who had previously assaulted her.
- In response, the defendant stated that no one would get away with hurting his girlfriend and directed DiBlasio to turn the car around.
- They located Hill outside a lounge, and the defendant, sitting in the front passenger seat with a gun, called Hill over to the car.
- When Hill walked toward the vehicle, the defendant shot him in the face.
- The gunshot wound was not fatal.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was tried in the Superior Court on charges of assault with intent to murder and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.
- During the trial, the judge denied the defendant's request to cross-examine prosecution witnesses Melvin Williams and Lori Newton about criminal charges pending against them.
- The defendant also requested a jury instruction that his intoxication could be considered on the element of specific intent to murder, but the judge declined and instructed that voluntary intoxication was not an excuse.
- A jury found the defendant guilty on both charges.
- The defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, challenging the trial judge's rulings on cross-examination and the jury instruction on intoxication.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit prejudicial error by prohibiting a defendant from cross-examining a key prosecution witness about pending criminal charges to show bias, particularly when that witness's trial testimony is more damaging than their prior statements? And for the crime of assault with intent to murder, must the prosecution prove a specific intent to kill, and can the jury consider the defendant's intoxication in determining if that intent existed?
Opinions:
Majority - Wilkins, J.
Yes, a trial court's complete denial of the right to cross-examine a key witness for bias based on pending criminal charges constitutes prejudicial error. For the charge of assault with intent to murder, the Commonwealth must prove a specific intent to kill, and a jury should be instructed that it may consider evidence of a defendant's intoxication in determining if this specific intent was present. The court held that the defendant had a right to inquire into the pending charges against witness Lori Newton to expose potential bias in favor of the Commonwealth. The denial of this right was prejudicial because Newton's trial testimony was materially more damaging to the defendant than her prior statement, suggesting she may have altered her testimony to curry favor with prosecutors. The court also established a new rule for Massachusetts, holding that for crimes requiring a specific intent, evidence of voluntary intoxication is relevant to whether the defendant could form that intent. This overrules the prior state doctrine and aligns Massachusetts with the majority view, reasoning it is illogical to allow consideration of intoxication for deliberate premeditation in murder cases but not for specific intent in other crimes.
Concurring - Hennessey, C.J.
Yes, but the new rule regarding voluntary intoxication should be narrowly applied. The concurrence agrees with the majority's reasoning and outcome but writes separately to emphasize that the relevance of voluntary intoxication is limited to crimes requiring a 'specific intent,' like assault with intent to murder. The author stresses that this rule should not be extended to the 'great majority of crimes of violence,' such as armed robbery or assault with a dangerous weapon, as it would be contrary to public interest and the realities of violent crime in society.
Analysis:
This decision significantly altered Massachusetts criminal law in two ways. First, it strongly affirmed a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses by probing for bias, limiting a trial judge's discretion to foreclose such cross-examination. Second, and more importantly, the case abandoned the state's long-standing minority rule on voluntary intoxication. By allowing juries to consider intoxication when assessing specific intent, the ruling created a new partial defense for a range of crimes, requiring prosecutors to overcome an additional hurdle and fundamentally changing how such cases are tried and defended.
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