Commonwealth v. Gowan
1990 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2890, 399 Pa. Super. 477, 582 A.2d 879 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
When a constitutionally protected First Amendment right to free speech is implicated, an actor must intend to breach the public peace by making unreasonable noise for their conduct to constitute disorderly conduct, and mere annoyance to the public is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Facts:
- On November 2, 1987, Ronnie M. McRae and Daniel W. Gowen, preachers of the Anabaptist faith, were preaching and distributing religious literature in Central Park, Johnstown, Pennsylvania.
- During their activity, McRae and Gowen were making loud noises, described by a police officer as Gowen 'yelling at the top of his voice' and McRae 'preaching in a loud manner.'
- Their loud preaching attracted a crowd across the street, caused traffic to stop, and prompted other persons in the park to move to the other end.
- Police officers received complaints at the police station about the loud noise and people waving their arms in Central Park.
- Police Captain Petro directed Daniel Gowen four times to lower his voice.
- Daniel Gowen failed to comply with the directive to lower his voice.
- Ronnie McRae also continued preaching loudly and refused to comply after being directed to lower his voice.
- William Felix, a store owner 150-200 feet from the park, heard the preaching inside his store with the door open and stated it was disturbing and reduced his ice cream sales.
Procedural Posture:
- Ronnie M. McRae and Daniel W. Gowen were arrested for disorderly conduct on November 2, 1987.
- McRae and Gowen waived their rights to counsel and to jury trials.
- On April 19, 1988, their consolidated cases were presented at a non-jury bench trial in the trial court.
- The trial court found McRae and Gowen guilty of disorderly conduct as a summary offense.
- McRae and Gowen filed motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment.
- On June 7, 1988, the trial court denied McRae and Gowen's motions.
- On July 5, 1988, sentence was entered against both McRae and Gowen, ordering each to pay prosecution costs and a $50 fine.
- McRae and Gowen (appellants) appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does loud preaching, as an exercise of free speech in a public park, constitute 'unreasonable noise' under Pennsylvania's disorderly conduct statute, warranting conviction, when it causes only annoyance to some members of the public and there is no evidence of intent to breach the public peace?
Opinions:
Majority - TAMILIA, Judge
No, loud preaching, as an exercise of free speech in a public park, does not constitute 'unreasonable noise' under Pennsylvania's disorderly conduct statute, warranting conviction, when it causes only annoyance to some members of the public and there is no evidence of intent to breach the public peace. The court must carefully balance the fundamental right to free speech against annoyance or inconvenience to other persons. While the exercise of free speech can exceed constitutionally protected boundaries, mere annoyance to the public from protected activity is insufficient to establish disorderly conduct. Relying on Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, the court stated that when a First Amendment right to free speech is implicated, the actor must intend to breach the public peace by making unreasonable noise. The Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that McRae and Gowen possessed such intent. The evidence presented, including testimony from police and a store owner, indicated various reactions from the public—some annoyance, but also watching, listening, and laughing—which is consistent with more than mere annoyance. The court also noted that the park had been used for other religious, secular, political, and entertainment purposes with varying degrees of loudness, suggesting that the treatment of sound as 'unreasonable noise' depended more on acceptance of participants than actual noise, and in the absence of definitive regulations, loudness alone did not amount to a breach of peace.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the robust protection afforded to First Amendment free speech rights, particularly when balanced against general public disturbance statutes. It clarifies that merely causing annoyance or subjective discomfort through loud speech, even in a public setting, is generally insufficient for a disorderly conduct conviction without concrete evidence of an intent to breach the public peace. The ruling places a substantial burden on the prosecution to prove specific criminal intent when constitutionally protected speech is involved, rather than relying solely on the volume or impact of the noise. This case suggests that municipalities should establish clear and neutral regulations regarding noise in public spaces, rather than relying on subjective enforcement of broad statutes, to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
