Commonwealth v. Darch
767 N.E. 2d 1096, 2002 Mass. App. LEXIS 638, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 713 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant may assert a defense of lack of criminal responsibility due to involuntary intoxication from prescribed medication, even if they also voluntarily consumed alcohol, unless they had reason to know that combining the medication and alcohol would result in a diminished mental state.
Facts:
- Officer Robert Mansfield found the defendant, Darch, seated in her car after it had apparently struck another vehicle.
- Mansfield noted an odor of alcohol on Darch's breath and her slurred speech.
- Approximately eight hours after the incident, Darch submitted to a breathalyzer test, which registered a blood-alcohol level of .14.
- Darch had been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, depression, and anxiety and was taking four prescribed medications: Wellbutrin, Effexor, BuSpar, and Ativan.
- All four medications carried warnings that they should not be taken with alcohol.
- Darch's expert witness, Dr. Millet Hardy, testified that Darch was over-medicated, which, combined with the two alcoholic drinks she admitted to consuming, precipitated a manic and psychotic state.
- Dr. Hardy opined that at the time of the incident, Darch was unable to control her behavior in a rational way and was influenced by delusions, which included an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide in her car just prior to driving.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, Darch, was tried in a Massachusetts District Court.
- A jury convicted Darch of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
- Darch appealed her conviction to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, arguing she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
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Issue:
Does a trial attorney's failure to request a jury instruction or fully argue a defense of lack of criminal responsibility, after introducing expert testimony that the defendant's intoxication was involuntarily caused by over-prescribed medication combined with alcohol, potentially constitute ineffective assistance of counsel warranting an evidentiary hearing?
Opinions:
Majority - Greenberg, J.
Yes, trial counsel's failure to pursue a defense of lack of criminal responsibility after establishing a strong evidentiary basis for it is sufficiently troubling to require an evidentiary hearing to determine if it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The defense of involuntary intoxication is available when a defendant suffers intoxicating effects from prescription medication, and the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving intoxication was voluntary. In cases of mixed intoxication (voluntary alcohol use and involuntary medication effects), the defense is precluded only if the defendant had reason to know the combination would impair their mental faculties. Here, defense counsel presented expert testimony that Darch's over-medication caused a psychotic state, squarely raising the issue of involuntary intoxication and lack of criminal responsibility. However, counsel then failed to press the issue in closing arguments or request a relevant jury instruction. Because there is no obvious tactical reason for this abandonment, the matter is remanded for an evidentiary hearing to explore trial counsel's strategic reasoning.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the application of the involuntary intoxication defense in cases involving a combination of prescription drugs and voluntary alcohol consumption. It establishes that the defense is not automatically negated by the consumption of some alcohol; the key is whether the defendant had foreknowledge of the potential adverse interaction. The court's remand emphasizes the procedural preference for resolving ineffective assistance of counsel claims through evidentiary hearings at the trial court level, where counsel's strategic decisions can be fully examined. This approach avoids speculative second-guessing by appellate courts and ensures that a defendant's rights are protected if counsel's performance was indeed deficient and prejudicial.
