Commonwealth v. Collins
470 Mass. 255 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
An in-court identification by an eyewitness who participated in a non-suggestive pretrial identification procedure but failed to make an unequivocal positive identification is inadmissible unless the prosecution proves there is 'good reason' for its admission. This rule applies prospectively to trials commencing after this opinion.
Facts:
- Pierre Laguerre arranged to purchase two kilograms of cocaine from the defendant, known as 'Goodie,' for $38,000.
- On December 5, 2006, Myles Lawton drove Laguerre to an apartment rented by Teresa Jones, Lawton's girlfriend, to conduct the transaction.
- The defendant arrived at the apartment, pulled out a gun, and demanded the money from Laguerre.
- During the confrontation, the defendant shot and killed Lawton, then shot Laguerre three times, took the money, and fled.
- Teresa Jones, who was in a separate bedroom, briefly saw the shooter's face when he opened her door for a moment before the shooting began.
- During a police investigation, Jones was shown a sequential photo array of eight individuals.
- Jones did not make a positive identification but indicated that the perpetrator was between photograph number four (the defendant) and number eight, later stating that number four looked more like the person.
- Jones's downstairs neighbor also saw a man with a gun leaving the apartment and later told police he was 75% sure a photo of the defendant was the man he saw.
Procedural Posture:
- A jury in the Superior Court (trial court) convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and possession of an unlicensed firearm.
- The defendant, with new counsel, filed a motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.
- The trial judge denied the motion for a new trial.
- The defendant appealed both his convictions and the denial of his new trial motion.
- The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the state's highest court) granted direct appellate review.
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Issue:
Is an in-court identification by an eyewitness admissible when that witness previously participated in a non-suggestive identification procedure but failed to make an unequivocal positive identification of the defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Gants, C.J.
No, unless there is 'good reason' for its admission. An in-court identification by an eyewitness who previously failed to make an unequivocal positive identification is presumptively inadmissible due to its inherent and powerful suggestiveness. The court reasoned that such in-court 'showups' present a substantial danger of misidentification. When a witness who was previously uncertain sees the defendant at the defense table, they are likely to view the prosecution as confirmation that this is the correct person, leading to an 'artificially inflated level of confidence.' This confirmatory feedback can distort the witness's memory and make it difficult for a jury to accurately assess the identification's reliability, a problem that cross-examination cannot reliably cure. Extending the rule from Commonwealth v. Crayton, the court held that these identifications should be excluded unless the prosecution files a motion in limine and demonstrates a 'good reason' for admitting the highly suggestive evidence. However, because this new rule applies prospectively, and the law at the time of trial permitted the identification, the defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, and the conviction is affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands judicial safeguards against unreliable eyewitness testimony in Massachusetts, building upon the precedent set in Commonwealth v. Crayton. By extending the 'good reason' requirement to witnesses who were previously uncertain (not just those who made no prior identification), the court closes a significant loophole and discourages reliance on highly suggestive in-court showups. This ruling forces prosecutors to rely more heavily on the outcomes of less suggestive, out-of-court identification procedures, thereby promoting fairer trials. The decision reflects a growing judicial acknowledgment of scientific research on the fallibility of memory and the contaminating effects of suggestive identification practices.
