Commonwealth v. Claycomb
566 S.W.3d 202 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
Under Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution, any legislative act that creates a mandatory delay preventing a claimant from immediately accessing the courts to seek redress for a common-law personal injury claim is unconstitutional. The constitutional provision guaranteeing justice "without... delay" is an absolute prohibition, not a standard of reasonableness.
Facts:
- In 2017, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the Medical Review Panel Act (the Act).
- The Act requires that all medical malpractice claims be reviewed by a medical review panel before a plaintiff can file a lawsuit in court.
- A claimant must wait until the panel issues an opinion, or until nine months have passed, before they are permitted to commence an action in court.
- Ezra Claycomb, a minor, suffers from severe brain damage and cerebral palsy.
- His mother, Tonya Claycomb, alleges that his condition was caused by medical malpractice.
- As a result of the Act, Tonya Claycomb was legally barred from immediately filing a medical malpractice lawsuit in circuit court on behalf of her son.
Procedural Posture:
- Ezra Claycomb, by and through his parent Tonya Claycomb, filed suit against the Commonwealth in a Kentucky trial court, seeking a declaration that the Medical Review Panel Act was unconstitutional.
- The trial court found the Act unconstitutional on multiple grounds and entered a permanent injunction against its enforcement.
- The Commonwealth appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's intermediate appellate court, and requested emergency relief from the injunction.
- The Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's request and suspended the trial court's injunction.
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky, the state's highest court, then accepted a transfer of the case to decide the constitutional merits.
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Issue:
Does Kentucky's Medical Review Panel Act, which requires medical malpractice claimants to submit their proposed complaint to a panel and await its opinion before filing suit, violate the open-courts provision of Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Minton, C.J.
Yes, the Medical Review Panel Act violates the open-courts provision of Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution. The court held that Section 14, which guarantees that all courts shall be open and provide a remedy "without... delay," is a restraint on the power of all branches of government, including the legislature. Tracing the provision's history from Magna Carta, the court distinguished the American constitutional context, where framers were wary of legislative as well as executive overreach. The court reasoned that the phrase "without... delay" is an absolute and unambiguous command, rejecting the idea of a "reasonableness" standard for such delays. By forcing a claimant to submit to a non-adjudicative panel process before accessing the courts, the Act unconstitutionally usurps a claimant's freedom to seek immediate redress for common-law personal injury claims. The court distinguished this from statutory claims, over which the legislature has more power, and voluntary alternative dispute resolution.
Concurring - Cunningham, J.
Yes, the Act is unconstitutional, but it violates the prohibition against special legislation in Section 59(5) of the Kentucky Constitution, not Section 14. The Act constitutes special legislation because it arbitrarily grants a special privilege—protection from immediate litigation—to a single class of defendants (health care providers) while denying that same protection to all other tort defendants. This favoritism is precisely the kind of discrimination that the constitutional prohibition on special acts was designed to prevent.
Concurring - Keller, J.
Yes, the Act is unconstitutional, but the majority's reasoning is overly broad. While this particular Act interferes with the fundamental right to access courts in an "unreasonably broad way," the majority's absolutist interpretation of "without delay" is incorrect. The constitutional phrase "remedy by due course of law" could encompass reasonable procedural requirements established by the legislature. The majority's rigid holding that any delay is unconstitutional is a departure from flexible constitutional interpretation and unnecessarily ties the hands of the General Assembly in the future.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Kentucky's open-courts provision as one of the nation's most stringent protections for access to justice for common-law claims. By rejecting a 'reasonableness' standard for pre-litigation delays, the court severely limits the legislature's ability to enact tort reform measures that impose mandatory procedural hurdles before filing suit. The ruling effectively invalidates pre-litigation screening panels for common-law personal injury cases and signals that similar legislative schemes, such as mandatory pre-suit mediation, would also likely be unconstitutional. The decision reinforces the judiciary's role in protecting common-law rights from legislative encroachment and will force lawmakers to find alternative, likely voluntary or post-filing, mechanisms to manage malpractice litigation.
