Commonwealth v. Brown
886 A.2d 256, 2005 Pa. Super. 358, 2005 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3920 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
When a charging document for burglary specifies the particular crime a defendant intended to commit therein, the prosecution must prove the defendant had the specific intent to commit that particular crime for the burglary conviction to be sustained.
Facts:
- On June 21, 2003, David Brown was arrested in connection with an attempt to enter a building.
- The Commonwealth filed a charging document, known as an Information, against Brown.
- The Information charged Brown with Attempted Burglary.
- The Information specifically stated that the crime Brown intended to commit inside the building was 'theft'.
Procedural Posture:
- The Commonwealth charged David Brown in a trial court with Attempted Burglary, Attempted Theft, and Criminal Trespass.
- Brown waived his right to a jury, and a bench trial was held on February 2, 2004.
- The trial court judge acquitted Brown of attempted theft, finding insufficient evidence of intent to steal.
- The trial court judge found Brown guilty of attempted burglary, reasoning he intended to commit some unspecified crime.
- On April 15, 2004, the trial court sentenced Brown to 40 to 80 months of incarceration.
- Brown, as the Appellant, filed an appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania against the Commonwealth, the Appellee.
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Issue:
Does sufficient evidence support a conviction for attempted burglary when the Commonwealth's charging document specifically alleged an intent to commit theft, but the trial court found insufficient evidence that the defendant possessed the specific intent to commit theft?
Opinions:
Majority - Lally-Green, J.
No. The evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for attempted burglary. When the Commonwealth's charging document specifies the crime a defendant intended to commit during a burglary, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the defendant's specific intent to commit that particular crime. Here, the Information explicitly charged Brown with attempting to enter a building with the intent to commit theft. However, the trial court acquitted Brown of attempted theft, expressly finding insufficient evidence that he intended to steal. Because the Commonwealth failed to prove the specific intent for the particular crime it alleged in the Information, an essential element of the burglary charge, as pleaded, was not met. While the prosecution is generally not required to specify the intended crime in a burglary charge, once it chooses to do so, its proof must measure up to that specific charge.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a critical rule of criminal pleading and proof, emphasizing that the prosecution is bound by the specific charges it brings. It serves as a significant caution to prosecutors against 'over-pleading' by being more specific than necessary in an indictment or information. While normally the intent element of burglary can be satisfied by an inferred intent to commit any crime, this case establishes that specifying a particular crime elevates that crime's intent to a material element of the burglary charge itself, which must then be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This precedent forces prosecutors to strategically balance the notice provided to a defendant against the risk of creating a higher, and potentially fatal, burden of proof for themselves.
