Commonwealth v. Blache
880 N.E.2d 736, 450 Mass. 583, 2008 Mass. LEXIS 29 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
In a rape prosecution based on a complainant's incapacity to consent due to intoxication, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant was so impaired as to be incapable of consenting, and that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the complainant's incapacity.
Facts:
- On August 17, 2000, the complainant, having not eaten all day, consumed marijuana, Klonopin (an antianxiety medication), and a significant amount of alcohol.
- She became visibly and severely intoxicated, having difficulty walking, falling down, and being argumentative.
- After leaving a bar, the complainant drove her truck into a fence and the house belonging to her date, David MacRae.
- The defendant, Methuen Police Officer David Blache, was dispatched to MacRae's house in response to a call for assistance with an unwanted, intoxicated female guest.
- At the scene, the complainant exhibited bizarre and sexually aggressive behavior toward Officer Blache, including touching him, propositioning him for sex, licking his cruiser window, and urinating in the street.
- Officer Blache received permission from his headquarters to transport the complainant home in his police cruiser.
- The complainant testified that Officer Blache raped her in the back of the cruiser, while Blache testified they had consensual intercourse at her home after he dropped her off and later returned.
- Shortly after the incident, the complainant made two phone calls to a friend at MacRae's house, first stating in a 'bragging' tone, 'Tell Dave thanks for the best fuck of my life,' and then, minutes later, 'Tell Dave I’m going to go for the whole rape thing.'
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant, David Blache, was tried on an indictment for rape in the Superior Court (trial court).
- A jury found the defendant guilty of rape.
- The defendant (as appellant) appealed the conviction to the Massachusetts Appeals Court (intermediate appellate court).
- The Appeals Court affirmed the defendant's conviction.
- The defendant (as appellant) successfully petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (highest court) for further appellate review.
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Issue:
Did the trial court's jury instructions, which used the archaic term 'wholly insensible' and failed to require proof of the defendant's knowledge of the complainant's incapacity, adequately explain the law of consent in a rape case involving extreme intoxication?
Opinions:
Majority - Botsford, J.
No, the trial judge's instructions failed to adequately explain the law regarding a complainant's incapacity to consent. The court establishes that where the Commonwealth seeks to prove rape by showing the complainant was incapable of consenting due to intoxication, it must prove that 1) the complainant was so impaired as to be incapable of consenting, and 2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of this incapacity. The court found the term 'wholly insensible,' taken from the 1870 case Commonwealth v. Burke, to be archaic, ambiguous, and confusing for a modern jury, as demonstrated by the jury's question for clarification. Furthermore, the instructions improperly separated the 'wholly insensible' standard from the element of lack of consent and failed to require proof of the defendant's knowledge of the complainant's incapacitated state. This knowledge requirement is necessary because in incapacity cases, the element of force is reduced to only that necessary for penetration, which removes the usual safeguard that negates a defendant's potential mistake as to consent. The conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial where the defendant will be entitled to an instruction on this new rule.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Spina, J.
No, the instructions were flawed, but for different reasons. Justice Spina concurs with the judgment that a new trial is required but dissents from the majority's reasoning. He argues that the 'wholly insensible' instruction from Commonwealth v. Burke should not have been given at all because the evidence did not support a finding that the complainant was unconscious or nearly so, which he contends is the proper standard. The complainant's memory of telling the defendant 'no' and resisting proves she was not totally incapable of consenting. The real error was the instruction that allowed the jury to find a lack of consent based on intoxication alone, which improperly lowered the Commonwealth's burden. Justice Spina strongly disagrees with the majority's new, broader standard ('so impaired as to be incapable of consenting'), warning it will expose individuals who have sex with intoxicated partners to a great risk of unjust prosecution and turn rape trials into battles of experts over subjective levels of impairment.
Analysis:
This decision significantly modernizes Massachusetts rape law concerning incapacity to consent due to intoxication. It abandons the archaic 'wholly insensible' standard from the 19th-century Burke case in favor of a more functional inquiry into whether the complainant was 'so impaired as to be incapable of consenting.' The most impactful change is the creation of a new element the prosecution must prove in such cases: that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the complainant's incapacity. This introduces a mens rea (mental state) component that serves as a safeguard in situations where the traditional element of 'force' is diminished, thereby protecting defendants from conviction based on a reasonable mistake of fact about consent.
