Commonwealth v. Barone
419 A.2d 457 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for homicide by vehicle under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732 requires the Commonwealth to prove more than an unintentional traffic violation that caused a death. The statute requires proof that the defendant acted with culpable negligence, defined as a 'gross deviation' from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe.
Facts:
- On the morning of September 14, 1977, Theresa Barone was operating her motor vehicle.
- Barone arrived at the intersection of Bethel Grant Road and Morris Road and came to a complete stop at a stop sign.
- Observing that traffic on the intersecting thoroughfare was heavy, Barone waited for approximately two to three minutes for an opportunity to cross.
- Barone then proceeded into the intersection.
- While in the intersection, Barone's vehicle was struck by a motorcycle.
- The operator of the motorcycle died from injuries sustained in the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Theresa Barone was charged with homicide by vehicle in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.
- Barone filed a pre-trial petition seeking to declare the homicide by vehicle statute unconstitutional, which the trial court dismissed.
- The case proceeded to a trial.
- At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the trial court granted Barone's demurrer, finding the evidence insufficient to support a conviction and discharging her.
- The Commonwealth, as appellant, appealed the order granting the demurrer to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
- Barone, as appellee, filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court's earlier dismissal of her constitutional claims.
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Issue:
Does a conviction for homicide by vehicle under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732 require proof of a culpable mental state, such as negligence, or does the statute impose strict liability for any death resulting from a traffic violation?
Opinions:
Majority - Cercone, President Judge
Yes, the statute requires proof of a culpable mental state. Homicide by vehicle is not a strict liability offense but requires a showing that the defendant acted with culpable negligence. The term 'homicide' has a long common law history of requiring some degree of fault, and the word 'unintentionally' in the statute merely clarifies that the death was not purposeful, not that all fault is eliminated. Because the statutory language is ambiguous, the court must look to legislative intent, which was to fill the gap between minor traffic infractions and the 'reckless or grossly negligent' standard for involuntary manslaughter. The statute was intended to punish conduct amounting to a 'gross deviation' from the standard of care, which is the definition of criminal negligence. Here, Barone's conduct in stopping and waiting for several minutes before proceeding into the intersection did not constitute a 'gross deviation,' and therefore the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
Concurring - Spaeth, Judge
No, the statute was intended by the legislature to impose strict liability. The history of the Uniform Vehicle Code, from which the statute was derived, shows a deliberate legislative choice to remove a fault requirement to make convictions easier to obtain than under the involuntary manslaughter statute. However, as a strict liability crime, the statute violates the due process clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It is unconstitutional to impose a severe penalty (up to five years' imprisonment) and the grave stigma associated with a 'homicide' conviction without requiring any proof of fault or 'moral delinquency.' Because the statute cannot be saved by judicial interpretation without usurping the legislative function, it is unconstitutional, and the defendant's discharge must be affirmed.
Dissenting - Wieand, Judge
No, the statute imposes strict liability and does not require proof of a culpable mental state. The language of the statute is 'precise and unambiguous,' requiring only three elements: 1) a violation of a traffic law, 2) the death of another, and 3) a causal connection. The legislature has the power to create strict liability offenses to protect public safety, and it did so here in response to the 'deplorable carnage on our highways' and the difficulty of securing involuntary manslaughter convictions. The Commonwealth's evidence showed Barone failed to yield the right-of-way, causing a death, which was sufficient to send the case to a jury. The trial court erred by improperly adding a negligence requirement not present in the statute.
Analysis:
This case highlights the judicial tension between deferring to legislative intent to create strict liability public welfare offenses and upholding the traditional criminal law principle that punishment requires fault (mens rea). The fractured court leaves the state of the law on this issue somewhat uncertain, though the practical outcome is that prosecutors cannot obtain a vehicular homicide conviction by merely proving a traffic violation and a resulting death. Judge Cercone's lead opinion, by reading a criminal negligence standard into the statute, provides a middle ground that saves the statute from the constitutional infirmity identified by Judge Spaeth's concurrence. This approach establishes a new tier of culpability for vehicular deaths, below the 'recklessness' required for involuntary manslaughter but above a simple traffic infraction.
