Commonwealth Ex Rel. Smith v. Myers
438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550, 56 A.L.R. 3d 217 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant engaged in the commission of a felony cannot be convicted of murder under the felony-murder rule if the death is inflicted by a third party, such as a police officer or the victim, who is acting in opposition to the felony. To establish liability for felony-murder, the killing must be committed by the felon or an accomplice in furtherance of the felonious act.
Facts:
- On January 30, 1947, James Smith, along with Edward Hough and David Almeida, engaged in an armed robbery of a supermarket in Philadelphia.
- While attempting to escape, a gunfight occurred between the robbers and police officers who had arrived at the scene.
- During the exchange of gunfire, an off-duty police officer named Ingling was shot and killed.
- The evidence presented at trial was conflicting as to whether the fatal bullet was fired by one of the robbers or by another police officer.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1948, a jury in a Pennsylvania trial court convicted James Smith of first-degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
- Smith did not file post-trial motions or a direct appeal following his conviction.
- In 1966, Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, a trial-level court.
- Smith argued he was denied his right to appeal and that the trial court's jury instruction on the felony-murder rule was unconstitutional.
- The Court of Common Pleas denied Smith's habeas corpus petition.
- Smith then appealed the denial of his petition to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does the felony-murder rule apply to hold a defendant criminally liable for murder when the fatal shot is fired by a third party, such as a police officer, acting in opposition to the felony?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice O’Brien
No. The felony-murder rule does not apply to hold a defendant criminally liable for murder when the fatal shot is fired by a third party acting in opposition to the felony. The court found that its prior ruling in Commonwealth v. Almeida, which established a proximate cause theory for felony-murder, was a 'radical departure from common law criminal jurisprudence' and constituted an unwarranted extension of the doctrine. The court reasoned that for felony-murder, malice is imputed from the underlying felony, but the act of killing must be committed by the felon or an accomplice acting in furtherance of the criminal undertaking. By explicitly overruling Almeida, the court rejected the tort-based proximate cause theory in criminal homicide cases, arguing that criminal liability requires a more direct causal connection than civil liability due to the severe penalties involved. The court adopted what is known as the 'agency theory' of felony-murder, which was previously articulated in Commonwealth v. Redline.
Dissenting - Mr. Chief Justice Bell
Yes. The felony-murder rule should apply to hold a defendant liable for murder when a death results from third-party action because the death is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's felonious act. The dissent argued that when a felon initiates a dangerous crime like armed robbery, they set in motion a chain of events and should be held responsible for any death that results, as resistance from victims or police is a natural and probable outcome. Relying on the prior precedents of Commonwealth v. Moyer and Commonwealth v. Almeida, the dissent defended the 'proximate cause' theory, stating that the felonious act is the legal cause of the death, regardless of who fires the fatal shot. The dissent criticized the majority's decision as 'pro-criminal,' arguing it undermines public safety and creates an unjust outcome, especially since Smith's co-felons had previously been denied relief under the very rule the majority now embraces for Smith.
Analysis:
This case marks a significant retreat from a broad application of the felony-murder rule in Pennsylvania by explicitly overruling Commonwealth v. Almeida and its 'proximate cause' theory. The court's adoption of the 'agency theory' narrows the scope of felony-murder, requiring that the fatal act be committed by a felon or their accomplice for liability to attach. This decision aligns Pennsylvania with the majority of American jurisdictions and the traditional common law rule, creating a clear distinction between the causation required for criminal homicide and that required for civil torts. The ruling prevents prosecutors from charging murder for deaths caused by police or victims during the commission of a felony, thereby limiting convictions to situations where the felons themselves are the direct agents of death.
