Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin
2000 WL 1059739, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10785, 106 F. Supp. 2d 445 (2000)
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Rule of Law:
State laws that define food as "kosher" according to "orthodox Hebrew religious requirements" and mandate state enforcement of these religious dietary laws violate the Establishment Clause by fostering excessive entanglement between government and religion and having the impermissible effect of advancing religion.
Facts:
- Plaintiffs Brian and Jeffrey Yarmeiseh owned Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. (Commack Kosher), a butcher shop in Commack, Long Island.
- The Yarmeisehs described themselves as Jewish but stated they were "not observant in accordance with the tenets of Orthodox Judaism."
- Commack Kosher, "at the times relevant hereto," had "kosher supervision ... under the auspices of a duly ordained rabbi of the Jewish faith."
- New York State had laws (Challenged Laws) aimed at protecting consumers of "kosher" food products from fraud, which state courts had authoritatively interpreted for decades as equating "kosher" with "prepared in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements."
- The Challenged Laws included provisions mandating specific preparation procedures (e.g., meat must be "washed in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements ... by a duly ordained orthodox rabbi"), requiring food to be marked "soaked and salted" or "not soaked and salted," and creating a nine-person advisory board to counsel the Commissioner on kosher law enforcement.
- Commack Kosher received multiple citations from the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets for alleged violations of the Kosher Laws, including failing to properly label poultry and for possessing unsalted products.
- In 1987, after receiving a citation, Commack Kosher informed the Department that their meat processing was satisfactory to their supervising rabbi and requested state guidance on its interpretation of kosher procedures; the Department did not respond but instead issued a complaint alleging failure to kosher meat "in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements."
- A charge against Commack Kosher for quarantined lamb tongues in 1988, found not properly "soaked and salted" or "deveined," remained pending according to plaintiffs.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs, Long Island merchants, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on January 16, 1996, and an amended complaint on April 15, 1996, challenging the constitutionality of New York's Kosher Laws.
- In December 1996, several Orthodox Jewish organizations, a rabbi, a competitor, and individual consumers were permitted to intervene jointly as defendants in the District Court.
- Plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction was denied by the District Court on June 18, 1998, but an agreement was reached for the defendant to notify plaintiffs of any alleged violations before releasing that information for publication.
- On December 15, 1997, the District Court denied the defendant's motion for abstention under the `Pullman` doctrine, clarifying that New York state courts had a settled interpretation equating "kosher" with "prepared in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements."
- Discovery was completed, and both plaintiffs and the defendant and intervenors sought summary judgment on various claims.
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Issue:
Does a state statutory scheme that defines "kosher" food as prepared "in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements," requires adherence to these religious standards, and establishes an advisory board to counsel on the enforcement of such religious laws, violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - GERSHON, District Judge
Yes, the state statutory scheme violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court found that the Challenged Laws, as authoritatively construed by New York state courts, explicitly equate "kosher" with "prepared in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements." This established interpretation is binding on the federal court, overriding the defendant's attempts to disavow it or claim the laws are merely registration statutes. Applying the three-pronged Lemon test, the court determined that while the laws had a secular purpose—to protect consumers from fraud—they failed both the "effect" and "excessive entanglement" prongs. Regarding excessive entanglement, the court held that the laws require the State to enforce religious dietary laws, necessarily compelling state officials to refer to and rely upon religious doctrines. This involves "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of New York State in the daily monitoring of the compliance of vendors of kosher products with a set of religious dietary laws." The existence and composition of the Kosher Law Advisory Board, predominantly comprised of rabbis who advise on policy and propose legislation regarding religious requirements, further illustrates this entanglement. The state's role in determining the content of religious law, even with an implied "good faith" defense, constitutes an unconstitutional fusion of governmental and religious functions. As for the effect prong, the court concluded that the laws have the impermissible effect of advancing and endorsing religion. By incorporating "orthodox Hebrew religious requirements" into state law and establishing a system for their enforcement, the State effectively assumes a traditional religious supervisory role. This creates a "symbolic union of church and State" that advances particular religious tenets. The court distinguished this case from `Agostini v. Felton`, noting that here, state officials are directly enforcing religious laws, unlike the neutral programs providing aid to religious schools in `Agostini`. The court relied on precedents such as `Ran-Dav’s County Kosher Inc. v. State` (New Jersey) and `Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control` (Baltimore), which invalidated similar kosher fraud laws on Establishment Clause grounds.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the boundaries of the Establishment Clause, particularly concerning state involvement in defining and enforcing religious standards. It serves as a critical precedent demonstrating that even consumer protection statutes, when deeply intertwined with specific religious doctrines and requiring governmental interpretation of religious law, can unconstitutionally blur the lines between church and state. The decision underscores that neutrality, rather than advancement or endorsement of any particular faith, is paramount, irrespective of the existence of a secular purpose or a widespread consensus on religious tenets. This ruling will likely prevent future attempts by states to delegate governmental authority to or share it with religious institutions, ensuring that the state does not become a de facto religious authority.
