Colvard v. Commonwealth
2010 WL 997405, 309 S.W.3d 239 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A victim's out-of-court statement to medical personnel identifying the perpetrator of sexual abuse is not admissible under the KRE 803(4) hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment. The identity of a perpetrator is generally not considered pertinent to medical treatment from the patient's perspective, which is the basis for the exception's reliability.
Facts:
- Fred Colvard lived in the same apartment complex as two young sisters, D.J. (age 6) and D.Y. (age 7).
- A few months before the alleged incident, Colvard had been engaged to marry the girls' grandmother.
- The grandmother ended the engagement after learning that Colvard had a 1994 conviction for attempting to rape a ten-year-old girl.
- On March 2, 2006, Colvard allegedly entered the girls' bedroom and sexually assaulted them.
- Immediately after the alleged assault, the girls told their mother that Colvard had assaulted them.
- The mother reported the assault to the authorities, and the girls were subsequently examined by medical professionals.
- Medical examinations did not find any DNA or other physical evidence connecting Colvard to the crime, although the findings were not inconsistent with the girls' allegations of sexual assault.
Procedural Posture:
- Fred Colvard was tried before a jury in Jefferson Circuit Court, the trial court of first instance.
- The jury found Colvard guilty of first-degree sodomy, first-degree rape (two counts), first-degree burglary, and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender.
- The trial court sentenced Colvard to life imprisonment based on the jury's verdict and recommendation.
- Colvard (Appellant) appealed his conviction as a matter of right to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, arguing against the Commonwealth (Appellee).
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Issue:
Does the KRE 803(4) hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment permit the admission of a child victim's out-of-court statements to medical personnel identifying the perpetrator of sexual abuse?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Venters
No. The KRE 803(4) hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not permit the admission of a victim's out-of-court statement identifying the perpetrator of abuse. The court overrules its prior decision in Edwards v. Commonwealth, which had created an exception for such statements in child abuse cases. The rationale for KRE 803(4) is that a patient has a selfish motive to be truthful to receive effective medical treatment, which gives the statement inherent trustworthiness. This rationale does not extend to statements of fault or identity, as it is the patient's desire for treatment, not the doctor's potential use of the information (e.g., for psychological care or preventing future abuse), that provides the necessary credibility. Because the multiple hearsay statements identifying Colvard—from medical personnel, the uncle, the mother, and a forensic interviewer—were improperly admitted and the error was not harmless given the lack of physical evidence, the conviction must be reversed.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - C.J. Minton
This opinion dissents only from the majority's conclusion that Colvard's 1994 attempted rape conviction was admissible under KRE 404(b). The justice argues that the facts of the prior conviction are not sufficiently similar to the current charges to satisfy the standard for modus operandi. The justice concurs with the majority in all other respects, including the holding on the KRE 803(4) hearsay issue.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Scott
This opinion dissents from the majority's decision to overrule Edwards v. Commonwealth. The dissent argues that in child sexual abuse cases, the identity of the abuser is, in fact, reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment. This is because treatment for a child victim involves not just physical injuries but also emotional and psychological trauma, and physicians have a duty to prevent recurrent abuse, especially when the perpetrator is a household member. The dissent notes that a majority of other states follow the rule established in United States v. Renville, which the court now rejects, and that abandoning this precedent removes a vital protection for child victims in Kentucky.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant narrowing of the medical diagnosis hearsay exception in Kentucky, running counter to a trend in many other jurisdictions that had expanded the exception in child abuse cases. By overruling Edwards, the court re-establishes a strict interpretation of KRE 803(4), focusing exclusively on the declarant's motive for seeking treatment rather than the physician's broader diagnostic or protective needs. This holding makes it more difficult for prosecutors to introduce corroborating testimony from medical professionals about a child victim's identification of an abuser. Consequently, it increases the evidentiary weight placed on the victim's own in-court testimony, as prosecutors cannot rely on a 'parade of witnesses' repeating the out-of-court identification.
