Collins v. Rocky Knob Associates, Inc.
1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 110, 911 S.W.2d 608, 1995 WL 340093 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Under a recreational use statute, a landowner's failure to guard or warn against open and obvious dangers inherent in a natural body of water does not constitute "willful or malicious" conduct required to overcome the statute's general grant of immunity from liability.
Facts:
- On the late evening of May 18, 1991, April Pennington, age 16, and Timothy Stambaugh, age 24, were with friends in the parking lot of a marina operated by Rocky Knob Associates, Inc. at Paintsville Lake.
- The marina was closed and deserted at the time, and it was prom night, during which some individuals, including Pennington, had consumed alcohol.
- Sometime after midnight, Pennington and Stambaugh entered the lake, presumably to swim, while their friends remained in the parking lot.
- Approximately twenty minutes later, friends discovered Pennington's body floating in the water.
- Rescue workers recovered the bodies of both Pennington and Stambaugh, and autopsies determined the cause of death for both was drowning.
- Toxicology reports showed Pennington had a blood alcohol content of .10 and Stambaugh had a blood alcohol content of .03.
- The area where the drowning occurred was unlit and the lake contained natural hazards like deep water and jagged rocks.
Procedural Posture:
- Sharon Collins and Jewell Stambaugh, parents of the decedents, filed a wrongful death action against Rocky Knob Associates, Inc., in the Johnson Circuit Court (trial court).
- Rocky Knob moved for summary judgment, arguing it was shielded from liability under Kentucky’s Recreational Use Statute, KRS 411.190.
- The trial court determined that Rocky Knob's conduct did not rise to the level of willful or malicious and granted summary judgment in its favor.
- Collins and Stambaugh (appellants) appealed the summary judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, with Rocky Knob as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a landowner's failure to warn against the open and obvious dangers of swimming in a lake, such as by failing to post signs, light the shoreline, or provide security, constitute 'willful or malicious' conduct sufficient to impose liability under Kentucky's Recreational Use Statute?
Opinions:
Majority - Johnson, Judge
No. A landowner's failure to warn against open and obvious dangers inherent to a natural condition does not rise to the level of willful or malicious conduct required to create an exception to the immunity provided by Kentucky's Recreational Use Statute. The court distinguished this case, which involves 'passive negligence' (failing to warn of a pre-existing, natural hazard), from cases involving 'affirmative negligence,' such as creating an artificial, non-obvious hazardous condition. The dangers of a lake—deep water, rocks, and darkness—are natural and reasonably obvious. The statute protects landowners from liability for such inherent risks to encourage them to make their land available for public recreation. Holding Rocky Knob liable here would frustrate the legislative purpose of the statute, which is to limit, not broaden, a landowner's common law duties. Therefore, Rocky Knob's failure to post signs, light the shoreline, or provide security does not constitute willful or malicious conduct as a matter of law.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the high threshold for the 'willful or malicious' exception within Kentucky's Recreational Use Statute. By creating a distinction between 'affirmative' and 'passive' negligence, the court makes it substantially more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in claims against landowners for injuries arising from natural and obvious conditions on the land. This precedent strengthens the protective shield the statute affords to landowners, reinforcing the legislative goal of encouraging public access to private lands for recreation. Future litigation under this statute will likely hinge on whether the landowner created an artificial hazard or merely failed to warn of a natural one.
