Collini v. Wean United, Inc.
101 F.R.D. 408 (1983)
Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, a defendant may only implead a third-party who is or may be derivatively or secondarily liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim, and not a third-party who may be directly liable to the plaintiff.
Facts:
- Nine individuals were receiving permanent incapacity pensions and attendant insurance coverage from two benefit plans and Wean United, Inc. (Wean).
- Wean, as sponsor and administrator of the plans, discontinued these benefits, asserting that the plaintiffs were no longer permanently incapacitated.
- The International and Local Unions brought a separate suit (Civil Action No. 83-128) to enforce an arbitration award by a medical arbitrator concerning the permanent incapacity of the nine individual plaintiffs.
- Wean United, Inc., along with the benefit plans, sought to implead the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, and the United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 1388, as third-party defendants.
- Wean alleged that the United Steelworkers, acting as the exclusive bargaining agent for the plaintiffs, failed to pursue grievance and mandatory arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
- Wean contended that the unions' alleged failure caused or exacerbated any harm or damage suffered by the individual plaintiffs.
Procedural Posture:
- Nine individuals filed a lawsuit (Civil Action No. 82-1869) against two benefit plans and Wean United, Inc., alleging violations of ERISA and Pennsylvania common law.
- The International and Local Unions filed a separate lawsuit (Civil Action No. 83-128) to enforce an arbitration award related to the individual plaintiffs' permanent incapacity.
- Civil Action No. 83-128 was consolidated with Civil Action No. 82-1869 for purposes of discovery and trial.
- The defendants (Wean United, Inc. and the benefit plans) filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, seeking to implead the United Steelworkers of America and Local Union No. 1388.
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Issue:
Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 permit a defendant employer to implead a union, as a third-party defendant, on claims that the union’s failure to pursue grievance procedures caused or exacerbated harm to the plaintiffs, where the original claims are based on ERISA and state common law for wrongful discharge, and the unions' potential liability is asserted under the National Labor Relations Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Diamond, District Judge
No, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 does not permit a defendant employer to implead a union as a third-party defendant under these circumstances because there is no substantive basis in law for derivative or secondary liability from the unions to the employer. The court found that Rule 14 requires a third-party’s liability to be dependent on the outcome of the main claim or in the nature of derivative or secondary liability to the defendant, not direct liability to the plaintiff. The main claims, based on ERISA and Pennsylvania common law, do not provide a basis for impleader. First, ERISA is silent on the right to contribution, and the court will not amend or supplement its detailed remedial scheme. The legislative history of ERISA also does not support a right of contribution. Second, while a union owes a duty of fair representation to its members under the National Labor Relations Act, and may be liable to an employee for a breach of this duty, this liability is generally direct to the employee, not derivative to the employer in the context of the employer's liability for ERISA or common law claims. Impleading a party directly liable to the plaintiff is not permitted under Rule 14. Third, the common law count for tortious wrongful discharge is based on public policy under the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act, not the collective bargaining agreement, so the union’s duty of fair representation does not create derivative liability to the employer for these claims. Therefore, the defendants failed to provide a substantive legal basis to support their motion to implead the unions.
Analysis:
This case emphasizes the strict interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, affirming that impleader is reserved for situations of derivative or secondary liability, not direct liability to the plaintiff. It clarifies that a right to contribution under ERISA cannot be implied, given the statute's comprehensive remedial scheme and silence on the matter. The decision also distinguishes the union's duty of fair representation under the NLRA, which creates liability to employees, from a derivative liability to employers in ERISA or common law wrongful discharge suits, thereby limiting an employer's ability to shift responsibility in such actions. This impacts future cases by reinforcing the narrow scope of Rule 14 and requiring defendants to demonstrate a clear substantive legal basis for derivative liability, particularly in complex multi-statute claims involving labor unions.
