Colgrove v. Battin
37 L. Ed. 2d 522, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 42, 413 U.S. 149 (1973)
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Rule of Law:
The Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a right to trial by jury in civil cases does not require a jury of twelve members. A six-person jury is constitutionally permissible in federal civil trials.
Facts:
- The United States District Court for the District of Montana adopted Local Rule 13(d)(1), which mandated that juries for civil cases shall consist of six persons.
- Petitioner Colgrove was a litigant in a diversity suit filed in that district court.
- The respondent, District Court Judge James F. Battin, was assigned to preside over Colgrove's case.
- Judge Battin set the case for trial and prepared to impanel a six-person jury in accordance with the local rule.
- Colgrove objected to the six-person jury, demanding that a twelve-person jury be impaneled for the trial.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Colgrove sought a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit against respondent District Court Judge Battin.
- The petition requested that the Court of Appeals direct Judge Battin to impanel a 12-member jury, arguing that the local rule requiring a six-member jury was unconstitutional and invalid.
- The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the writ, upholding the validity of the local rule.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a local federal district court rule providing for a six-member jury in civil cases violate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
No, a local federal district court rule providing for a six-member jury in civil cases does not violate the Seventh Amendment. The historical purpose of the Seventh Amendment was to preserve the substantive right to a jury trial in suits at common law, not to codify all procedural incidents of the common-law jury, such as its size. The Court's analysis, relying on Williams v. Florida, determined that the number twelve is not a substantive aspect of the right to a jury trial, as jury performance is not a function of its size. The Framers were primarily concerned with ensuring the existence of the civil jury itself against abolition, not with freezing its 1791 characteristics. Past Court statements referring to a 'jury of twelve' were dicta and not binding precedent. Furthermore, the local rule does not conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 2072, as its requirement to preserve the right 'as at common law' is coextensive with the Seventh Amendment, nor is it inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48, which governs party stipulations but does not mandate a twelve-person jury as a constitutional or statutory floor.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
The dissent does not reach the constitutional issue. The local rule is invalid because it directly conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48. Rule 48, which allows parties to stipulate to a jury of 'any number less than twelve,' presupposes that a twelve-member jury is the default. By mandating a six-person jury, the local rule impermissibly collides with the federal rule, which should prevail. Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court has the authority to make such a change outside the established rulemaking process.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes, the local rule violates the Seventh Amendment. The Amendment's command that the right 'shall be preserved' requires a historical analysis, not a functional one. At common law in 1791, a jury was universally understood to consist of twelve members, and this feature was an essential part of the right the Framers intended to preserve. A six-person panel is a 'wholesale abolition' of the jury, not a minor procedural change, as it functions differently and is less representative of the community. The majority's reliance on a functional test is flawed because the composition of a jury is an arbitrary, a priori definition that should be fixed by historical understanding, not by a court's ad hoc judgment of what is 'enough.' Furthermore, the majority misreads both 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which explicitly protects the jury 'as at common law,' and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48, which presupposes a twelve-person jury.
Dissenting - Justice Powell
The dissent does not reach the constitutional issue. The local rule is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The case should be reversed on statutory grounds alone, as explained in Justice Douglas's dissent.
Analysis:
This decision solidified a functional, rather than strictly historical, approach to interpreting the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee, extending the logic of Williams v. Florida from the criminal to the civil context. By decoupling the constitutional right from the traditional twelve-person panel, the Court authorized a significant procedural innovation that promoted judicial efficiency and cost savings in federal courts. The ruling validated the practice of many district courts that had already adopted smaller juries and established six as a constitutionally acceptable number. However, by explicitly declining to decide whether any number less than six would suffice, the decision left the door open for future challenges to even smaller juries.
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