Coleman v. State
1982 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1127, 643 S.W.2d 124 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
When a criminal indictment uses a statutorily defined term that describes an act of the accused which can be committed in more than one distinct manner, the indictment is subject to a motion to quash for failure to provide adequate notice if it does not specify which manner the State intends to prove.
Facts:
- On or about June 15, 1978, Norman James Coleman was alleged to have taken four men's suits.
- The suits were the property of William Bruce Prescott.
- The total value of the suits was alleged to be at least $200.00 but less than $10,000.00.
- Coleman was accused of unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally appropriating the suits with the intent to deprive the owner of the property.
Procedural Posture:
- Norman James Coleman was charged by indictment in a Dallas County trial court with felony theft.
- Coleman filed a pre-trial motion to quash the indictment, arguing that the term 'appropriate' was not specific enough to provide adequate notice of the charges.
- The trial court denied the motion to quash.
- Following a trial, a jury found Coleman guilty and, after finding two prior felony convictions, assessed his punishment at life imprisonment.
- Coleman, as appellant, appealed to the Court of Appeals in Dallas.
- On rehearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, finding the indictment was defective and the motion to quash should have been granted.
- The State of Texas, as petitioner, sought and was granted a Petition for Discretionary Review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a theft indictment that uses the general term 'appropriate' fail to provide sufficient notice to the defendant when challenged by a motion to quash, because the statutory definition of 'appropriate' includes two distinct acts (transfer of title and exercise of control)?
Opinions:
Majority - Teague, Judge
Yes, a theft indictment using the general term 'appropriate' fails to provide sufficient notice when properly challenged. The statutory definition of 'appropriate' includes two distinct types of acts: (A) bringing about a transfer of title or (B) acquiring or otherwise exercising control over the property. Because 'appropriate' goes to an act of the defendant which can be committed through more than one manner or means, the accused is entitled to notice of which specific act the State will attempt to prove. Relying on the precedent set in Gorman v. State, the court found no distinction between a camera and suits as personal property that could be appropriated by either method. A lack of notice regarding the specific acts or omissions alleged constitutes a denial of fair notice, and the sufficiency of the indictment must be examined from the perspective of the accused. Therefore, the defendant's motion to quash should have been granted.
Dissenting - McCormick, Judge
This opinion was a dissent without a written explanation.
Analysis:
This decision, following Gorman v. State, solidifies the principle in Texas criminal procedure that an indictment must provide specific notice of the alleged criminal act, even if it tracks the statutory language. It clarifies that when a key term describing the defendant's conduct encompasses multiple, distinct methods of commission, the State must specify which method it intends to prove upon a defendant's motion to quash. This holding strengthens a defendant's right to fair notice, preventing trial by ambush and forcing the prosecution to commit to a specific theory of the case from the outset.
