Coleman v. Miller
307 U.S. 433 (1939)
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Rule of Law:
The efficacy of a state's ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment, including whether the amendment has lost its vitality through a lapse of time or whether a prior rejection bars subsequent ratification, is a non-justiciable political question for Congress to decide.
Facts:
- In June 1924, Congress proposed the Child Labor Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
- In January 1925, the Kansas Legislature adopted a resolution rejecting the proposed amendment.
- Nearly thirteen years later, in January 1937, a new resolution to ratify the amendment was introduced in the Kansas Senate.
- The vote on the ratification resolution in the 40-member Kansas Senate resulted in a 20-20 tie.
- The Lieutenant Governor of Kansas, acting as the presiding officer of the Senate, cast the deciding vote in favor of the resolution.
- The Kansas House of Representatives subsequently adopted the ratification resolution by a majority vote.
Procedural Posture:
- Twenty-one members of the Kansas Senate and three members of the Kansas House of Representatives filed an original petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Kansas.
- The petitioners sought to compel the Secretary of the Senate to officially record that the ratification resolution had not passed and to enjoin other state officers from certifying the ratification.
- The Supreme Court of Kansas asserted jurisdiction over the matter but denied the writ, holding that the ratification by the Kansas legislature was valid and complete.
- The petitioners, the Kansas legislators, sought and were granted a writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court to review the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Are the questions of whether a constitutional amendment has lost its vitality due to a lapse of time, and whether a state's prior rejection bars subsequent ratification, justiciable issues for the courts to decide?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Hughes
No. The questions of whether a constitutional amendment has lost its vitality due to a lapse of time or whether a prior rejection bars subsequent ratification are non-justiciable political questions for Congress to resolve. The Court found that based on historic precedent, particularly the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the effect of a state's prior rejection is a political question for Congress, which has ultimate authority over the promulgation of amendments. Similarly, determining what constitutes a 'reasonable time' for ratification involves an appraisal of political, social, and economic conditions that are not suitable for judicial determination and lack satisfactory legal criteria. Therefore, Congress, in its control over the promulgation process, has the final say on whether an amendment remains viable before the requisite number of states have ratified it.
Concurring - Justice Black
No. The entire process of amending the Constitution under Article V is a political one, from submission by Congress to the final proclamation of ratification, and is not subject to judicial review at any point. Article V gives Congress exclusive and undivided control over the amending process. Any judicial pronouncement on the process, such as setting a 'reasonable time' limit for ratification as was implied in Dillon v. Gloss, is an unconstitutional interference with Congress's sole authority and should be disapproved. The courts have no power to guide, control, or interfere with this fundamentally political function.
Concurring - Justice Frankfurter
This opinion does not directly answer the issue but argues the case should be dismissed because the petitioners lack standing. The Kansas legislators do not have a particularized injury distinct from the general public. Their interest in the constitutional validity of the ratification process is a generalized political concern, not a personal legal right sufficient to create a 'case or controversy' required for federal court jurisdiction. Permitting legislators to sue over the outcome of votes would entangle the judiciary in intra-parliamentary disputes that are the essence of the political process and outside the scope of judicial power.
Dissenting - Justice Butler
Yes. The question of whether an unreasonable amount of time has elapsed since an amendment's proposal is a justiciable issue that the Court can and should decide. Citing the precedent of Dillon v. Gloss, which held that Article V implies a requirement of ratification within a reasonable time, the dissent argues that the Court has the power to determine if that time has passed. The dissent would hold that the more than thirteen years that elapsed between the proposal of the Child Labor Amendment and Kansas's attempted ratification was not a reasonable time, and therefore the ratification was invalid.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that the judiciary will not intervene in central aspects of the constitutional amendment process, classifying them as political questions reserved for Congress. By declaring the issues of timeliness and the effect of prior rejection non-justiciable, the Court significantly limited its own oversight role under Article V. This ruling shifts the final authority for resolving procedural disputes over ratification to the political branches, meaning Congress has the power to validate an amendment even after a long delay or conflicting state actions. The decision creates a high barrier for litigants seeking to challenge the validity of a constitutional amendment on procedural grounds in federal court.
