Coleman v. Hines
515 S.E.2d 57, 133 N.C. App. 147, 1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 364 (1999)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
When a passenger's contributory negligence in voluntarily riding with an intoxicated driver is as willful and wanton as the driver's negligence, the passenger's contributory negligence will bar recovery in a wrongful death action.
Facts:
- On the day of the accident, Wirt Hines was drinking when he visited Ms. Musso at her workplace.
- Ms. Musso was aware that Hines was drinking and they made plans to drink together later that evening before, during, and after an engagement party.
- Ms. Musso's employer, Ms. Hansma, pleaded with Ms. Musso not to ride with Hines and repeatedly offered to provide them a safe ride home from the party.
- Hines picked up Ms. Musso, and together they purchased a 12-pack of beer.
- Hines and Ms. Musso drank the beer in each other's presence over the course of the evening.
- After the party, Hines drove with Ms. Musso as a passenger, resulting in a fatal car accident.
- At the time of the accident, Hines' blood-alcohol content was at least .184, more than double the legal limit.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, representing the estate of Ms. Musso, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Wirt Hines in the trial court.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by Ms. Musso's contributory negligence.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
- The plaintiff, as appellant, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a passenger's willful and wanton contributory negligence in voluntarily riding with a known intoxicated driver bar a wrongful death claim, even when the driver's negligence was also willful and wanton?
Opinions:
Majority - Horton, Judge
Yes. A passenger's willful and wanton contributory negligence bars recovery when the passenger's own negligent actions rise to the same level as the defendant's willful and wanton negligence. While ordinary contributory negligence is typically not a defense to willful and wanton injury, this rule does not apply when the plaintiff's own conduct is equally culpable. The court found that Ms. Musso's actions—knowing Hines was drinking, planning to drink more with him, purchasing and consuming alcohol with him, and rejecting a specific offer for a safe ride home—constituted a 'similarly high degree of contributory negligence' as Hines's act of driving while intoxicated. Citing precedent from Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures of Asheville, the court concluded that allowing recovery under these facts would violate principles of logic and social policy. The court also rejected the plaintiff's 'last clear chance' argument, as Ms. Musso was not in a position of peril from which she could not escape; she had multiple opportunities to avoid the risk.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces and clarifies the contributory negligence doctrine in North Carolina, particularly in cases involving alcohol. It carves out a significant exception to the general rule that a defendant's willful and wanton negligence overcomes a plaintiff's ordinary contributory negligence. The court establishes that if a plaintiff's contributory negligence is also 'willful and wanton' and rises to the 'same level' as the defendant's, it remains a complete bar to recovery. This 'equal culpability' analysis requires courts to compare the deliberateness and risk-assumption of both parties, making it harder for plaintiffs who actively participated in the dangerous activity to succeed in their claims.
