Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School District
414 N.E.2d 639, 51 N.Y.2d 256, 434 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
The time period during which a court may grant an extension to serve a late notice of claim against a public corporation is coextensive with the statute of limitations for the underlying action and is therefore subject to the same statutory tolls, including the toll for infancy under CPLR 208.
Facts:
- Daniel Cohen, an infant, was participating in a junior varsity soccer game on the grounds of Pearl River High School on September 30, 1975.
- During the game, Cohen sustained an injury to his foot.
- The injury was allegedly caused by a 'hidden object' protruding from the ground of the soccer field.
- Cohen did not serve a notice of claim upon the school district within the required 90-day period following the injury.
- The relevant law, General Municipal Law § 50-e(5), was amended effective September 1, 1976, while Cohen's potential claim was still viable under the old one-year rule for seeking late notice.
Procedural Posture:
- On December 5, 1977, Daniel Cohen's father applied to the Special Term of the Supreme Court (the trial court) for judicial leave to serve a late notice of claim on behalf of his son against Pearl River Union Free School District.
- Special Term granted the application.
- Pearl River School District, as appellant, appealed the decision to the Appellate Division (the intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division reversed the order of Special Term, denying the application.
- The petitioner, Daniel Cohen, appealed the Appellate Division's reversal to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does the infancy toll provided in CPLR 208 apply to the time limit within which a court may grant leave to serve a late notice of claim against a public corporation under the amended General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)?
Opinions:
Majority - Gabrielli, J.
Yes. The infancy toll provided in CPLR 208 applies to the time limit for seeking permission to file a late notice of claim. The amended version of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) makes the period during which an extension may be granted coextensive with the Statute of Limitations governing the claim. Since it is well-established that the statute of limitations for claims against public corporations is tolled for infancy under CPLR 208, the time for seeking leave to file a late notice is concomitantly tolled. The legislature's choice to define the extension period by direct reference to the statute of limitations, and its specific inclusion of the phrase 'by the claimant,' indicates a clear intent to incorporate established tolling provisions based on a claimant's disability. This holding does not mandate that an extension must be granted, but rather confers discretionary authority upon the court to entertain the application of a disabled claimant during the period of disability.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the application of the 1976 amendments to New York's General Municipal Law, harmonizing the notice of claim requirements with general tolling principles under the CPLR. It establishes that the procedural prerequisite of filing a notice of claim does not operate to extinguish an infant's substantive right to sue before they are legally capable of asserting it. By making the window to seek leave coextensive with the tolled statute of limitations, the court prevents a procedural bar from negating the protections afforded to minors at law. This precedent ensures that courts retain jurisdiction to exercise discretion in cases involving infant claimants for the entire period of their infancy.
