No, freedom of the press doesn't protect newspapers from the consequences of breaking a promise. The law about keeping promises (promissory estoppel) applies to everyone, not just journalists. The press has to follow the same general rules as all other citizens, like paying taxes or obeying traffic laws. By making a promise, the newspapers created their own legal problem, so they can't use the First Amendment as an excuse to get out of it.

Yes, forcing the newspaper to pay for this does violate freedom of the press. This isn't just about a broken promise; it's about punishing a newspaper for publishing true and important information during an election. The public has a right to know who is leaking political dirt. The court should have used a very tough standard, protecting the press unless there was an extremely important reason to punish it, which there wasn't here.

Yes, the public's right to information is more important here than enforcing the promise. Freedom of the press is for the public's benefit, so we can be informed citizens and make smart decisions. Knowing that a political insider was leaking information is very relevant to voters. In this specific situation, the value of publishing that truth was more important than the harm from breaking the promise to Cohen.

No, the First Amendment doesn't stop Cohen from recovering damages. The law Cohen used to sue the newspapers applies to everyone, not just the press. Newspapers have to follow the same general laws as everyone else. They don't get special protection from the First Amendment to avoid the consequences of breaking promises. Cohen isn't suing for defamation, which would be hard to prove since the information was true. He's suing because the broken promise made him lose his job and earn less money.

I disagree with the majority. I think this case is about the speech itself, not just the fact that the newspapers are the ones being sued. The First Amendment should protect anyone who publishes this kind of truthful information, not just the press. The state's interest in enforcing the promise wasn't strong enough to overcome the First Amendment's protection of free speech.

I don't think it matters that the law applies to everyone. We still have to balance the interests on both sides to decide if it's okay to limit First Amendment rights. Here, the public had a strong interest in knowing about Cohen's identity and role in the campaign. That's exactly the kind of information the First Amendment strongly protects. The state's interest in making the newspaper keep its promise wasn't strong enough to outweigh the public's right to know the truth.

Yes, the First Amendment can stop someone from recovering damages under a general state law in this situation. I disagree with the majority. I think this case is about the speech itself, not just the fact that the newspapers are the ones being sued. The First Amendment should protect anyone who publishes this kind of truthful information, not just the press. The state's interest in enforcing the promise wasn't strong enough to overcome the First Amendment's protection of free speech.

Yes, the First Amendment can stop someone from recovering damages under a general state law in this situation. I don't think it matters that the law applies to everyone. We still have to balance the interests on both sides to decide if it's okay to limit First Amendment rights. Here, the public had a strong interest in knowing about Cohen's identity and role in the campaign. That's exactly the kind of information the First Amendment strongly protects. The state's interest in making the newspaper keep its promise wasn't strong enough to outweigh the public's right to know the truth.

—generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news

First Amendment does not prohibit a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, if the defendant newspaper breaches its promise of confidentiality

T] he First Amendment does not confer... a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law

The Court explained that "enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations."

Given Cohen's general principle that "[t] he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws [,]"

On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that "enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a promissory estoppel theory would violate defendants' First Amendment rights

Cohen pursued a promissory estoppel claim against the news company that truthfully identified him in news stories as its news source after promising him anonymity.

In Cohen, for example, the petitioner revealed confidential information regarding a political race to newspapers after receiving a promise of confidentiality from their reporters.

In contrast, a law of general applicability does not "offend the First Amendment simply because [its] enforcement" may have an "incidental effect []" on speech.

After the New Deal, however, the state action doctrine underwent a radical transformation, and the Supreme Court ruled that various judicial actions amounted to state action where, previously, those actions likely would not have.

No. The First Amendment does not prohibit a plaintiff from recovering damages under state promissory estoppel law for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality. The Minnesota doctrine of promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability that does not target or single out the press. The Court has long held that generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report news. Unlike cases where the state itself defines the content of publications that trigger liability, here the legal obligation was self-imposed by the newspapers when they made the promise. Therefore, enforcing that promise through a generally applicable law is not subject to stricter First Amendment scrutiny.

Yes. The use of a promissory estoppel claim to penalize the reporting of truthful information regarding a political campaign violates the First Amendment. The majority mischaracterizes the issue as one of general applicability; the liability is based entirely on the content of the speech—the publication of truthful information. This case is more analogous to Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, where a general law was not permitted to penalize protected speech. The controlling precedent should be Smith v. Daily Mail, which requires that any punishment of lawfully obtained, truthful information must be justified by a state interest 'of the highest order,' a standard not met here.

Yes. The state's interest in enforcing a newspaper's promise of confidentiality is insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in the unfettered publication of newsworthy information. The fact that promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability is not dispositive; a balancing of competing interests is required when such laws burden speech. The public's interest in knowing the source of political information is paramount, as freedom of the press exists to create a better-informed citizenry. The identity of Cohen was newsworthy information relevant to a gubernatorial election, and the value of its publication outweighs the state's interest in enforcing the promise.

The First Amendment does not prohibit a plaintiff from recovering damages under state promissory estoppel law for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality given in exchange for information, because the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability that does not target or single out the press. The enforcement of general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to other entities or individuals. In this case, Cohen is not attempting to use a promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel or defamation claim. He is seeking damages for breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity. The First Amendment does not grant the press limitless protection or a special privilege to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law.

The Court's decision is premised, not on the identity of the speaker, but on the speech itself. The First Amendment protection afforded respondents would be equally available to nonmedia defendants. The state's interest in enforcing its promissory estoppel doctrine in this case was far from compelling. To the extent that truthful speech may ever be sanctioned consistent with the First Amendment, it must be in furtherance of a state interest 'of the highest order.' Because the publication at issue was truthful and the state's interest was not compelling, I would affirm the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision.

I do not believe the fact of general applicability to be dispositive. It is necessary to articulate, measure, and compare the competing interests involved in any given case to determine the legitimacy of burdening constitutional interests. The importance of the public interest in the information revealed in this case is integral to the balance that should be struck. Cohen's identity expanded the universe of information relevant to the choice faced by Minnesota voters in the 1982 gubernatorial election, the publication of which was thus quintessentially subject to strict First Amendment protection. I believe the State's interest in enforcing the newspaper's promise of confidentiality is insufficient to outweigh the interest in unfettered publication of the information revealed in this case.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

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