Coggan v. Coggan
239 So. 2d 17 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
A cotenant in exclusive possession of commonly owned property is not liable to the cotenant out of possession for rent unless the cotenant in possession has communicated a clear and unequivocal intent to hold the property adversely and exclusively, thereby effecting an ouster.
Facts:
- George H. Coggan and Sarah M. Coggan jointly owned an office building, which George used for his medical office.
- In 1963, the couple divorced and became tenants in common of the property.
- The divorce decree did not include any provisions regarding the use, possession, or payment of rent for the office building.
- Following the divorce, George Coggan continued to exclusively occupy the building as his medical office.
- George Coggan paid all the taxes, made necessary repairs, and exercised complete control over the property.
- George Coggan did not pay any rent to Sarah Coggan for her interest in the property during his period of exclusive possession.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1967, Sarah M. Coggan sued George H. Coggan in trial court for partition of the office building and for an accounting of one-half of its rental value.
- The trial court ordered the partition and the accounting in favor of Sarah Coggan.
- George H. Coggan (appellant) appealed the trial court's decision to the District Court of Appeals, Second District.
- The District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that George Coggan's actions were the 'equivalent of ouster.'
- George H. Coggan (petitioner) then petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a cotenant's exclusive possession of formerly marital property and his uncommunicated subjective belief that he is the sole owner constitute an 'ouster' requiring him to account for and pay rent to the cotenant out of possession?
Opinions:
Majority - Moody, J.
No. A cotenant's exclusive possession and uncommunicated belief of sole ownership do not constitute an ouster. The common law rule holds that a cotenant in possession is not liable for rent to a cotenant out of possession unless there is an ouster or its equivalent. An ouster requires that the tenant in possession manifest or communicate to the other cotenant that they are claiming an exclusive right or title. The possession must be attended by circumstances that impart knowledge of this adverse claim to the tenant out of possession. In this case, there is no evidence that George Coggan, prior to the lawsuit, ever advised Sarah Coggan that he was claiming the property adversely to her or took any action that would constitute an ouster. His denial of the cotenancy in his answer to the complaint and his trial testimony regarding his personal belief of sole ownership are insufficient because they were not communicated to her before she filed suit.
Dissenting - Boyd, J.
Yes. The evidence sufficiently demonstrated a consistent denial by the petitioner that a cotenancy ever existed, which should be considered an ouster. The trial court and the District Court of Appeal correctly concluded from the record that the petitioner is liable to account to the respondent for her share of the rental value of the premises. The lower courts' decisions should be affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the high evidentiary standard required to prove an 'ouster' between tenants in common. It establishes that a cotenant's subjective intent or belief of sole ownership is legally irrelevant; what matters is an objective act of communication that puts the other cotenant on notice of the adverse claim. This ruling protects cotenants out of possession from losing their rights through the silent, uncommunicated actions of the possessing cotenant. For future cases, it solidifies the principle that mere exclusive use, without more, does not trigger a duty to pay rent, and that a claim of ouster generally cannot be based on statements made for the first time in litigation.
