Coffman v. Keene Corp.
133 N.J. 581, 38 A.L.R. 5th 911, 628 A.2d 710 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
In strict liability failure-to-warn cases, a rebuttable presumption exists that a plaintiff would have heeded an adequate warning had one been provided, thereby satisfying the plaintiff's burden of proving proximate causation unless the defendant produces evidence to rebut it, particularly in workplace settings.
Facts:
- In 1951, George Coffman began working as an electrician at the Philadelphia naval shipyard.
- Coffman worked inside various ships, often in cramped interiors with poor ventilation, where he was exposed to asbestos supplied by Keene Corporation and other manufacturers.
- As an electrician, Coffman was near tradesmen installing asbestos insulation and also directly cut into asbestos insulation himself to install or repair cables.
- None of the asbestos products supplied by Keene Corporation contained any health or safety warnings.
- In 1985, Coffman was diagnosed with pulmonary asbestosis and asbestos fibers in his lungs, causing him anger, shock, and extreme fear due to his brother-in-law's death from asbestos-induced lung cancer.
- Coffman and his spouse subsequently commenced a product-liability action against Keene Corporation, alleging that the absence of warnings was a proximate cause of his asbestosis.
Procedural Posture:
- George Coffman and his spouse, Elizabeth Coffman, commenced a product-liability action against Keene Corporation and several other asbestos manufacturers in the trial court (court of first instance).
- At trial, the court instructed the jury to presume that if defendant had provided an adequate warning, it would have been followed, and the jury was asked to determine only whether defendant’s product was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injury.
- The jury awarded plaintiff $300,000 for pain and suffering, $100,000 for fear of developing lung cancer, and $6,000 for medical surveillance, concluding that Keene Corporation had substantially contributed to plaintiff's injuries and was approximately 15% responsible.
- Keene Corporation filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied.
- Keene Corporation (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey (intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment, ruling that a plaintiff in a failure-to-warn case may rely on a “heeding presumption” to prove proximate causation.
- The Supreme Court of New Jersey (highest court) granted certification to review the Appellate Division's ruling.
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Issue:
Does a rebuttable presumption exist in strict liability failure-to-warn cases that a plaintiff would have heeded a warning had it been provided, allowing that presumption, if unrebutted, to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof regarding proximate causation?
Opinions:
Majority - Handler, J.
Yes, a rebuttable presumption exists in strict liability failure-to-warn cases that a plaintiff would have heeded an adequate warning had one been provided, and this presumption, if unrebutted, can satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof regarding proximate causation. The Court acknowledged that while this "heeding presumption" is not based on empirical evidence or "natural" logic, its creation is grounded in strong public policy objectives that shape strict product liability law. These objectives include fostering greater product safety, encouraging manufacturers to remain apprised of hazards, easing the burden of proof for injured plaintiffs by eliminating the need to prove manufacturer negligence, and rationally allocating the risk of loss to manufacturers. The presumption serves to reinforce the manufacturer's basic duty to warn and prevents causation determinations from being based on speculative or unreliable evidence such as self-serving testimony. The Court noted that many other jurisdictions have adopted this presumption, often referencing Comment j to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In the specific context of workplace injuries, the presumption extends to both the employee and the employer. Therefore, to rebut the presumption, the manufacturer must prove that either the plaintiff-employee, if possessing a meaningful choice, would not have heeded the warning, or that the employer would not have heeded the warning by taking reasonable precautions for employee safety and would not have allowed employees to take measures to avoid or minimize harm. This approach is consistent with prior rulings recognizing that employees in a workplace often lack meaningful choice in confronting product risks, and manufacturers have a duty to ensure warnings reach employees, often through employers.
Analysis:
This case significantly alters the burden of proof for plaintiffs in failure-to-warn product liability cases in New Jersey, particularly those involving workplace injuries. By establishing a rebuttable "heeding presumption," the court shifts the onus to manufacturers to prove that their failure to warn was not the proximate cause of injury, rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove they would have heeded a warning. This decision reinforces New Jersey's public policy goals of promoting product safety and victim compensation, making it more challenging for manufacturers to escape liability based on speculative arguments about consumer behavior. It provides stronger protection for workers who may have limited choices regarding workplace hazards and emphasizes the manufacturer's broad duty to warn both employees and employers.
