Codd v. Velger
429 U.S. 624 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A nontenured public employee is not entitled to a name-clearing hearing under the Due Process Clause for a stigmatizing discharge unless the employee affirmatively alleges that the stigmatizing material is substantially false.
Facts:
- Velger was employed as a probationary patrolman with the New York City Police Department (NYPD).
- During his probationary period, an incident occurred where Velger allegedly put a revolver to his head in an apparent suicide attempt.
- The NYPD subsequently dismissed Velger from his position without providing a hearing.
- Information regarding the apparent suicide attempt was placed in Velger's personnel file by the NYPD.
- Velger later secured a position with the Penn-Central Railroad Police Department.
- With Velger's consent, an officer from Penn-Central reviewed Velger's NYPD personnel file and learned of the apparent suicide attempt.
- Following this review, the Penn-Central Railroad Police Department dismissed Velger.
- At no point in the legal proceedings did Velger affirmatively assert that the report of the apparent suicide attempt was false.
Procedural Posture:
- Velger filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the New York City Police Department in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The District Court first ruled that Velger, as a probationary employee, had no property interest in his job that would entitle him to a hearing.
- Velger filed an amended complaint, arguing he was entitled to a hearing due to the stigmatizing effect of material placed in his personnel file.
- After a bench trial, the District Court found against Velger, concluding he had not proven that he had been stigmatized.
- Velger, as appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court's finding of no stigma was clearly erroneous.
- The New York City Police Department, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require a hearing for a discharged public employee who claims their termination was stigmatizing, if the employee does not allege that the stigmatizing information is substantially false?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The Due Process Clause does not require a hearing in this situation. The purpose of a name-clearing hearing for a stigmatized employee is to provide an opportunity to refute the charges and clear one's name. If the employee does not challenge the substantial truth of the stigmatizing information, a hearing would serve no useful purpose. The hearing is solely to address the veracity of the claims, not to determine whether the employer's decision to terminate was justified based on true information. Absent a factual dispute over the accuracy of the report, there is no constitutional right to a hearing.
Dissenting - Brennan
Yes. A hearing is required. Once an employee alleges a deprivation of liberty due to a stigmatizing termination without a hearing, the burden should shift to the employer to prove the damaging information was true. The employee should not bear the initial burden of pleading falsity. The denial of a due process hearing is itself a constitutional injury, regardless of whether the stigmatizing information is ultimately proven true.
Dissenting - Stevens
Yes. A hearing is required for several reasons. First, a discharged employee should not have to allege falsity to state a due process claim, as the purpose of a hearing is both to determine the truth of a charge and to decide if the charge, even if true, warrants termination. Second, the Court of Appeals was incorrect to overturn the District Court's finding that no stigma occurred. Third, the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals to decide the separate issue of whether Velger had a property interest in his job, an issue that court never reached.
Dissenting - Stewart
Yes, on procedural grounds. While generally agreeing with the majority's reasoning on the stigma issue, the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings to consider the unresolved property interest claim, as suggested by Justice Stevens.
Concurring - Blackmun
No. While joining the majority opinion, it is important to emphasize the narrowness of the holding. This case does not address the constitutional limits on disclosing prejudicial information that, while true, is irrelevant to job performance or otherwise inappropriate for an employer to disseminate.
Analysis:
This decision significantly refines the 'stigma-plus' liberty interest doctrine established in Board of Regents v. Roth. It adds a crucial procedural hurdle for plaintiffs by requiring them to affirmatively plead and prove the falsity of the stigmatizing information as an essential element of their due process claim. This places a substantial burden on the discharged employee and narrows the circumstances under which a public employer must provide a name-clearing hearing. The ruling makes it more difficult for employees to challenge reputational harm connected to their termination unless they are prepared to dispute the underlying facts of the employer's claims.
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