Cochran v. NYP Holdings, Inc.
58 F.Supp.2d 1113, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1108, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 71 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
Statements of opinion concerning public figures and matters of public concern are protected by the First Amendment and are not actionable as defamation if they cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts that are provably false. Criticisms of an attorney's trial strategy, when based on publicly known facts and couched in rhetorical hyperbole, are generally considered non-actionable opinion because they are not susceptible to being proven true or false.
Facts:
- Johnnie L. Cochran, a nationally known attorney, successfully served as the lead defense counsel for O.J. Simpson in his highly publicized criminal murder trial, resulting in an acquittal.
- Cochran's trial strategy, which included a theory of a police conspiracy, was the subject of intense public debate and media scrutiny.
- Following the Simpson trial, Cochran considered joining the legal team for Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant who alleged he was tortured by New York police officers.
- Andrea Peyser, a columnist for the New York Post, wrote an opinion column arguing against Louima retaining Cochran.
- Peyser's column contained the statement: 'But history reveals that he [Cochran] will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of the truth.'
- Both parties in the ensuing lawsuit agreed that the word 'history' in the statement referred exclusively to Cochran's representation of O.J. Simpson.
Procedural Posture:
- Johnnie L. Cochran filed a defamation action against Andrea Peyser and New York Post Holdings in U.S. District Court.
- Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- Defendants also filed a motion to transfer venue to the Southern District of New York.
- Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing the challenged statement was non-actionable opinion.
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Issue:
Does a statement in an opinion column, asserting that a famous attorney 'will say or do just about anything to win, typically at the expense of the truth' based on his publicly known trial strategy, constitute a provably false assertion of fact actionable as defamation?
Opinions:
Majority - Wardlaw, District Judge
No, the statement does not constitute a provably false assertion of fact and is therefore non-actionable opinion protected by the First Amendment. To determine if a statement implies a factual assertion, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances. Here, the broad context of the statement was an opinion column, not a news article, signaled by its tone, format, and placement in the newspaper. The specific context shows the statement was surrounded by rhetorical hyperbole and figurative language, such as calling Cochran's team 'legal scoundrels' and his defense a 'fantasy tale.' Most critically, the statement is not susceptible of being proven true or false; a critique of trial strategy is an interpretation of public events and a matter of judgment, not an objectively verifiable event like perjury or a product's performance. Because the statement is based on disclosed, publicly known facts from the Simpson trial, readers are free to evaluate the author's interpretation and are not led to believe it is based on undisclosed facts.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the robust First Amendment protection afforded to opinion and rhetorical hyperbole, particularly when directed at public figures involved in matters of intense public interest. It provides a clear application of the Milkovich standard, emphasizing that for a statement to be defamatory, it must be provably false. The decision sets a strong precedent that criticism of professional judgment and strategy, such as that of a lawyer in a high-profile trial, is likely to be deemed protected opinion, thereby shielding journalists and commentators from defamation liability for expressing harsh, subjective views on public events.
