Clohessy v. Bachelor
1996 Conn. LEXIS 148, 675 A.2d 852, 237 Conn. 31 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A bystander may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress if they are closely related to the victim, their emotional injury is caused by the contemporaneous sensory perception of the event causing the victim's death or serious physical injury, and the bystander's emotional injury is itself serious.
Facts:
- Mary A. Clohessy, her son Liam, and her other seven-year-old son, Brendan P. Clohessy, were leaving a church in New Haven.
- The three attempted to cross Hillhouse Avenue at an intersection within a marked crosswalk.
- Mary Clohessy walked in the middle, with Liam to her right and Brendan to her left.
- Kenneth L. Bachelor was operating an automobile on an intersecting street at an excessive speed.
- The exterior side view mirror of Bachelor's vehicle struck Brendan's head, throwing him onto the road.
- Both Mary Clohessy and Liam witnessed the impact directly.
- They went to Brendan's assistance and held him as he experienced pain from his ultimately fatal head injuries.
- As a direct result of witnessing the accident and its aftermath, both Mary Clohessy and Liam suffered severe emotional distress.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary A. Clohessy and her son Liam Clohessy filed a complaint against Kenneth L. Bachelor in a Connecticut trial court.
- The third count of the complaint sought damages for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- The defendant filed a motion to strike the third count, arguing it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under existing state law.
- The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike.
- Following the striking of the count, the trial court rendered judgment against the plaintiffs on that count.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court.
- The Supreme Court of Connecticut transferred the appeal to itself for decision.
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Issue:
Does Connecticut law permit a bystander to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress after witnessing a closely related person suffer death or serious physical injury due to a defendant's negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Berdon, J.
Yes, Connecticut law permits a cause of action for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress under specific, limited circumstances. The court overrules its prior precedent in Strazza v. McKittrick, which had barred such recovery. The court rejects the older, more restrictive 'zone of danger' rule, deeming it arbitrary because it would illogically deny recovery to a mother who witnesses her child's death from a few feet outside the immediate area of physical risk. Instead, the court adopts a 'reasonable foreseeability' standard, concluding that it is foreseeable to a negligent defendant that a close relative witnessing a traumatic event would suffer severe emotional harm. To prevent unlimited liability, the court establishes a new four-part test that future plaintiffs must satisfy, balancing the protection of genuine emotional interests against the public policy need to limit the legal consequences of negligent acts to a controllable degree.
Analysis:
This decision significantly alters Connecticut tort law by formally recognizing the cause of action for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court abandons the long-standing 'zone of danger' rule for the more modern 'reasonable foreseeability' approach, aligning Connecticut with the majority of jurisdictions. By establishing a clear, four-part test, the decision provides a structured framework intended to compensate genuine, severe emotional harm while preventing a flood of spurious claims. This precedent sets a new standard for all future bystander NIED cases in the state, requiring lower courts to apply the specific conditions related to relationship, perception, and severity of injury.
