Clisham v. Board of Police Commissioners of Naugatuck
613 A.2d 254, 1992 Conn. LEXIS 258, 223 Conn. 354 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
Due process requires a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, and this right is violated when a member of a quasi-judicial administrative body has prejudged the adjudicative facts of a case prior to the hearing.
Facts:
- Dennis E. Clisham was appointed chief of police of the borough of Naugatuck in July 1984, with then-mayor William Rado seconding the appointment.
- In May 1985, Terry L. Buckmiller, a political rival of Rado who had campaigned on a pledge to "get rid of Chief Dennis Clisham," was elected mayor.
- Edward Mason, a close political advisor and friend to Mayor Buckmiller, was part of an "inner circle" that met regularly and supported the mayor's goal of removing Clisham.
- Prior to his appointment to the police board, Mason actively worked on an unsuccessful effort to amend town regulations to change the requirement for firing the police chief from a unanimous vote to a simple majority.
- In November 1986, Mason attended a private meeting with Mayor Buckmiller and a quorum of the board of police commissioners where they agreed that Clisham should be replaced.
- In October 1987, Mayor Buckmiller appointed Mason to the board of police commissioners.
- In December 1987, the board charged Clisham with several violations of police department regulations, including alleged assaults and threats, which initiated removal proceedings.
- During the ongoing removal hearings in August 1988, Mason was quoted in a newspaper praising a magazine article he described as "devastating for Clisham."
Procedural Posture:
- The board of police commissioners of the borough of Naugatuck commenced a series of hearings to determine whether to remove Police Chief Dennis E. Clisham from office.
- During the hearings, Clisham filed a motion to disqualify three board members, including Edward Mason, alleging bias. The members did not recuse themselves.
- The five-member board voted unanimously to remove Clisham from his position as chief of police.
- Clisham appealed the board's decision to the Superior Court, which is the state's trial court of general jurisdiction.
- The Superior Court dismissed Clisham's appeal, finding no due process violation.
- Clisham appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the Appellate Court, an intermediate appellate court, and the case was transferred directly to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does the participation of a board member, who had previously engaged in political efforts to remove a police chief and publicly expressed negative views about him during the proceedings, violate the police chief's constitutional due process right to a hearing before an impartial tribunal?
Opinions:
Majority - Peters, C. J.
Yes, the participation of the biased board member violated the police chief's constitutional due process right to an impartial tribunal. A public employee with a property interest in their job, who can only be removed for cause, is entitled to a hearing before an impartial panel. While administrative adjudicators are presumed to be impartial, this presumption can be overcome by showing actual bias or a probability of bias 'too high to be constitutionally tolerable.' The test is whether a disinterested observer would conclude that the adjudicator had prejudged the facts of the case. Here, the cumulative and uncontradicted evidence—including Mason's political alliance with the mayor, his prior efforts to oust Clisham, his participation in a secret meeting to plan Clisham's removal, and his public statements during the hearing—overwhelmingly demonstrated that Mason had prejudged the case. The doctrine of necessity does not apply because the constitutional right to a fair hearing outweighs the procedural difficulty of not having a replacement mechanism for a disqualified board member.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the fundamental due process requirement of an impartial adjudicator, extending its protections robustly to quasi-judicial administrative proceedings like public employee termination hearings. It establishes that a high probability of bias, demonstrated through a cumulative pattern of conduct and statements, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of impartiality afforded to administrative officials. The court's rejection of the 'doctrine of necessity' prioritizes an individual's constitutional rights over administrative convenience, signaling that agencies cannot proceed with tainted panels simply because no alternative tribunal is specified by law. This precedent strengthens protections for public employees against politically motivated dismissals and clarifies the standard for disqualifying biased decision-makers in administrative law.
